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that the material appeal to the prurient interest in sex of the average person
nor that prohibited conduct need be portrayed in a patently offensive manner.
History: C. 1953, 76-5a-4, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 87, § 1; 1985, ch. 226, § 4.
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PARTl
PROPERTY DESTRUCTION
76-6-101. Definitions.
For purposes of this chapter:
(1) "Property" means any form of real property or tangible personal
property which is capable of being damaged or destroyed and includes a
habitable structure.
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(2) "Habitable structure" means any building, vehicle, trailer, railway
car, aircraft, or watercraft used for lodging or assembling persons or
conducting business whether a person is actually present or not.
(3) "Property" is that of another, if anyone other than the actor has a
possessory or proprietary interest in any portion thereof.
(4) "Value" means:
(a) The market value of the property, if totally destroyed, at the
time and place of the offense, or where cost of replacement exceeds the
market value; or
(b) Where the market value cannot be ascertained, the cost of
repairing or replacing the property within a reasonable time following
the offense.
(c) If the property damaged has a value that cannot be ascertained
by the criteria set forth in Subsections (a) and (b) above, the property
shall be deemed to have a value not to exceed $50.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-101, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-101; 1974, ch. 32, § 14.

Cross-References. - Bus Passenger Safety
Act, bombing buses or terminals, § 76-10-1505.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Market value.
Subsection (4)(a), which defines ''value" as
"the market value of the property, if totally
destroyed," will be construed narrowly within
its stated meaning, and where property is
merely stolen, then recovered, it will be valued

as at common law. State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811
(Utah 1977).
Market value is applicable only to property
that has been totally destroyed. State v.
Erickson, 568 P.2d 750 (Utah 1977).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arson and
Related Offenses § 1.
C.J.S. - 6A C.J.S. Arson § 3.

76-6-102.

A.L.R. - Pyromania and the criminal law,
51 A.L.R.4th 1243.

Arson.

(1) A person is guilty of arson if under circumstances not amounting to
aggravated arson, he by means of fire or explosives unlawfully and intentionally damages:
(a) any property with intention of defrauding an insurer; or
(b) the property of another.
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is:
(a) a second degree felony if the damage caused exceeds $5,000 value;
(b) a third degree felony if the damage caused exceeds $1,000 but is not
more than $5,000 value;
(c) a class A misdemeanor if the damage caused exceeds $250 but is not
more than $1,000 value; and
(d) a class B misdemeanor if the damage caused is $250 or less.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-102, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-102; 1986, ch. 59, § 1;
1989,ch.5,§
1.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
convict the defendant of burglary and arson.
State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d 892 (Utah 1986).

ANALYSIS

Elements of offense.
Evidence.
-Sufficient.
Flames unnecessary.
Lesser included offense.
Restitution to insurance company.
Cited.

Flames unnecessary.
Even though no flames developed, charring of
acoustical tile in jail was sufficient burning to
make the crime arson. State v. Nielson, 25 Utah
2d 11, 474 P.2d 725 (1970).

Elements of offense.
This section requires as an element of arson
that a person intentionally damage property.
State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah
1984).
Evidence.
-Sufficient.
Evidence regarding how and when a fire was
started, evidence that a fire was set in exactly
the manner that the defendant had threatened
in the event that he was fired, and the finding of
the defendant's handprint on an overturned
drum of a flammable chemical was sufficient to

Lesser included offense.
Arson is not a lesser included offense of
placing an infernal machine. State v. Vickers,
549 P.2d 449 (Utah 1976).
Restitution to insurance company.
The court did not exceed its authority in
ordering the defendant, convicted of intentionally, willfully, and maliciously committing arson upon his house, to reimburse insurance
companies for their loss in compensating the
bank which acquired the house through foreclosure. State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d 611 (Utah 1985).
Cited in United States v. Bedonie, 913 F.2d
782 (10th Cir. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 6A C.J.S. Arson § 4.
Key Numbers. - Arson <p 1.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arson and
Related Offenses § 5.

76-6-103. Aggravated

arson.

(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of fire or explosives he
intentionally and unlawfully damages:
(a) a habitable structure; or
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a participant in the
offense is in the structure or vehicle.
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the first degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-103, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-103; 1986, ch. 59, § 2.

Cross-References. - Destruction of school
property, § 76-8-715.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ror, when a correct instruction on the subject
was later given to the jury immediately before
their deliberations, to which no objection was
taken. State v. Bergwerff, 777 P.2d 510 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).

ANALYSIS

Elements of offense.
Evidence.
-Sufficient.
Liability of property owner or his agent.

Elements of offense.
Intent to defraud an insurer is not an element of aggravated arson. State v. Bergwerff,
777 P.2d 510 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Erroneous inclusion of intent to defraud an
insurer in the information as comprising an
element of aggravated arson was harmless er-

Evidence.
-Sufficient.
Circumstantial evidence sufficient to sustain
conviction. See State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123
(Utah 1986).
Liability of property owner or his agent.
Where owner of house hired defendant to
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burn it, owner could be convicted of aggravated
arson for burning his own house in absence of
evidence of accident or lawful purpose, and

therefore it was no defense for defendant that
he was acting under the direction of the owner.
State v. Durant, 674 P.2d 638 (Utah 1983).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arson and
Related Offenses § 3.

76-6-104.

C.J.S. - 6A C.J.S. Arson § 19.

Reckless burning.

(1) A person is guilty of reckless burning if he:
(a) recklessly starts a fire or causes an explosion which endangers
human life; or
(b) having started a fire, whether recklessly or not, and knowing that it
is spreading and will endanger the life or property of another, either fails
to take reasonable measures to put out or control the fire or fails to give a
prompt fire alarm; or
(c) damages the property of another by reckless use of fire or causing an
explosion.
(2) A violation of Subsections (a) and (b) is a class A misdemeanor. A
violation of Subsection (c) is a class A misdemeanor if damage to property
exceeds $1,000 value; a class B misdemeanor if the damage to property exceeds
$500 value; and a class C misdemeanor if the damage to property exceeds $50
value. Any other violation under Subsection (c) shall constitute an infraction
History: C. 1953, 76-6-104, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-104.
- Fires set during
Cross-References.

closed fire season without securing permit as
misdemeanors, § 65A-8-9.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. - Fires

Am. Jur. 2d. - 35 Am. Jur. 2d Fires § 6.
C.J.S. - 36A C.J.S. Fires § 1.

76-6-105.

<P

3.

Causing a catastrophe.

(1) Any person who by explosion, fire, flood, avalanche, collapse of a
building, release of poison gas, radioactive material, or other harmful or
destructive force or substance, or by any other means, causes a widespread
injury or damage to persons or property is guilty of causing a catastrophe.
(2) Causing a catastrophe is a felony of the second degree if the person
causes it knowingly and a class A misdemeanor if caused recklessly.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-105, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-105.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law

<P

13.
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76-6-106

76-6-106. Criminal mischief.
(1) A person commits criminal mischief if:
(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, he damages or destroys property with the intention of defrauding an insurer;
(b) he intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property of
another and thereby:
(i) recklessly endangers human life; or
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial interruption or
impairment of any public utility service;
(c) he intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of
another, including the use of graffiti as defined in Subsection 78-11-20(2);
or
(d) he recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile or other object
at or against a motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, locomotive, train,
railway car or caboose, whether moving or standing.
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a felony of the third degree.
(b) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any other violation of this section is a:
(i) felony of the third degree if the actor's conduct causes or is
intended to cause pecuniary loss in excess of $1,000 value;
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is intended
to cause pecuniary loss in excess of $500;
(iii) class B misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss in excess of $250; and
(iv) class C misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause loss of less than $250.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-106, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-106; 1992, ch. 14, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, added "including
the use of graffiti as defined in Subsection
78-11-20(2);or" to the end of Subsection (l)(c);
made stylistic changes in Subsections (2)(a)
and (2)(b); and added the numerical designations and made related changes in Subsection
(2)(c).
Cross-References. - Aircraft, tampering
with, § 2-1-30.

Airports and equipment, tampering with forbidden, § 2-1-31.
Damaging or destroying mining notices,
§ 40-1-11.
Livestock Brand and Anti-theft Act, Title 4,
Chapter 24.
Monuments of official surveys, damaging or
removing, § 76-8-415.
Theft, § 76-6-404.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Felony charge.
Intent.
Cited.

aggregate the damages suffered by the individual property owners from the separate acts of
vandalism to satisfy the minimum valuation
required to constitute a felony. State v. Barker,
624 P.2d 694 (Utah 1981).

Felony charge.
Defendant's smashing of windshields, in
rapid succession, of sixteen separately owned
automobiles that were parked at the same
parking lot was not a single act, but separate
acts with each being a violation of this section,
and state could not, for purpose of charging
defendant with a felony under this section,

Intent.
Where defendant was caught in act of peeling
safe in closed supermarket, offense was burglary; court could not reasonably have given
instructions on offense of unlawful entry with
intent to damage, injure or annoy, and jury
could not reasonably have found defendant
guilty thereof, because his intent must have

ANALYSIS
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been something other than damaging property,
or injuring or annoying a person. State v.
Dodge, 18 Utah 2d 63, 415 P.2d 212 (1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1013, 87 S. Ct. 726, 17 L. Ed.
2d 550 (1967).

Cited in State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 52 Am. Jur. 2d Malicious
Mischief § 1.
C.J.S. - 54 C.J.S. Malicious or Criminal
Mischief or Damage to Property § 3.

A.L.R. - Liability for desecration of graves
and tombstones, 77 A.L.R.4th 108.
Key Numbers. - Malicious Mischief e,., 1.

PART2
BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS
76-6-201.

Definitions.

For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted .
for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business
therein and includes:
(a) each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or
vehicle; and
(b) each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure
or vehicle.
(2) "Dwelling'' means a building which is usually occupied by a person
lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present.
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when
the premises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining
are not open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or
privileged to enter or remain on the premises or such portion thereof.
(4) "Enter" means:
(a) intrusion of any part of the body; or
(b) intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-201, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-201.

Cross-References. - Civil provisions, entry and detainer, § 78-36-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Dwelling.
The second-degree burglary statute (§ 76-6202(2)) is intended to protect people while in
places where they are likely to be living and
sleeping overnight, as opposed to protecting
property in buildings such as stores, business

offices, or garages; a cabin in the mountains
which is occupied less than fifty percent of the
time is a dwelling within the definition in
Subsection (2). State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 13 Am. Jur. 2d Burglary§ 1.
C.J.S. - 12A C.J.S. Burglary § 2.
A.L.R. - Maintainability of burglary charge,

where entry into building is made with consent,
58 A.L.R.4th 335.
What is "building" or ''house" within burglary
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or breaking and entering statute, 68 A.L.R.4th
425.
Minor's entry into home of parent as sufficient to sustain burglary charge, 17 A.L.R.5th
111.

76-6-202.

76-6-202

Use of fraud or trick as "constructive breaking" for purpose of burglary or breaking and
entering offense, 17 A.L.R.5th 125.
Key Numbers. - Burglary <1;:;, 1.

Burglary.

(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or
commit an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-202, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-202.

Cross-References. -Agreement
burglary, conspiracy, § 76-4-201.

to commit

NOTES TO DECISIONS
were adapted to commission of burglary. State
v. Crawford, 59 Utah 39, 201 P. 1030 (1921).

ANALYSIS

Attempted burglary.
Burglar's tools.
Consent to entry.
Conviction affirmed.
Dwelling.
Elements of offense.
Enhanced sentence.
-Federal law.
Evidence.
- Insufficient.
-Sufficient.
Instructions.
-Elements of offense.
- Lesser included offense.
- Presumptions.
Intent.
Intoxication.
Larceny and burglary.
Separate offenses.
Structures subject to burglary.
Theft distinguished.
Cited.

Consent to entry.
Where defendant obtained motel owner's
consent to his entry into premises by displaying
false identification and then stole television set,
consent gained by trick and with necessary
intent to steal did not preclude commission of
crime of burglary. State v. Pierce, 14 Utah 2d
177, 380 P.2d 725 (1963).
Conviction affirmed.
Even though prosecutor improperly questioned defendant concerning prior convictions
that he had already denied, defendant's conviction was nonetheless affirmed because there
was no reasonable likelihood that the outcome
of the trial would have been any different in the
absence of the prosecutor's misconduct. State v.
Peterson, 722 P.2d 768 (Utah 1986).

Attempted burglary.
In prosecution for assault with deadly
weapon and attempted burglary, defendants
could not have been prejudiced by court's failure to instruct on consummation of crime of
attempted burglary where ample evidence was
introduced from which jury could find that
burglary was attempted. State v. Rowley, 15
Utah 2d 4, 386 P.2d 126 (1963).
Burglar's tools.
In prosecution for burglary in third degree,
where marks and abrasions found on door of
burglarized house might have been made with
tools found in room occupied by defendant, tools
were properly admissible in evidence, even
though it was not shown that tools admitted

Dwelling.
Subsection (2) is intended to protect people
while in places where they are likely to be
living and sleeping overnight, as opposed to
protecting property in buildings such as stores,
business offices, or garages; a cabin in the
mountains which is occupied less than fifty
percent of the time is a dwelling within the
definition in § 76-6-201(2). State v. Cox, 826
P.2d 656 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Elements of offense.
Intent to commit larceny was element of
crime of burglary, and this intent could be
inferred where it was impossible to account for
defendant's presence in a closed store except to
commit larceny. People v. Morton, 4 Utah 407,
11 P. 512 (1886).
In prosecution for second degree burglary,
intent with which defendant entered structure
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was crux of case; instruction, as requested,
should have been made that if defendant at
time of entering believed he had right to property he intended to take, he would not be guilty.
State v. Evans, 74 Utah 389, 279 P. 950 (1929).
Crime of third degree burglary was perpetrated by defendant's entering garage with intent to steal. Rogerson v. Harris, 111 Utah 330,
178 P.2d 397 (1947).
Person may be convicted of burglary of a
nondwelling ifhe enters or remains unlawfully
in a building, not a dwelling, and does so with
the intent to commit a theft. State v. Sisneros,
631 P.2d 856 (Utah 1981).

Enhanced sentence.
-Federal law.
Congress did not intend implicitly to include
attempted burglary as a violent offense when it
specified burglary as a violent felony tihder 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), providing for enhanced sentences in certain circumstances.
United States v. Strahl, 958 F.2d 980 (10th Cir.
1992).
A conviction under § 76-4-101 (attempt) and
this section for attempted burglary is not a
conviction for an offense which "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another" under 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), providing for enhanced sentences, since attempted burglary
convictions, under Utah law, may include conduct well outside the federal statute's target of
"violent" felonies. United States v. Strahl, 958
F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992).

distinct, and conscious. State v. Thomas, 121
Utah 639, 244 P.2d 653 (1921).
Defendant was properly convicted of second
degree burglary where, shortly after it was
discovered that an attempt had been made to
break into safe in building, he was apprehended in building with materials usable in
burglary and had been seen running out of
room where safe was located. State v. Burch, 17
Utah 2d 418, 413 P.2d 805 (1966).
Fingerprint evidence, based on a comparison
of defendant's fingerprints with those found at
the scene. of the crime, along with the testimony
of defendant's accomplice, was sufficient evidence to find defendant guilty of burglary and
theft. State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985).
Evidence regarding how and when a fire was
started, evidence that a fire was set in exactly
the manner that the defendant had threatened
in the event that he was fired, and the finding of
the defendant's ha:ndprint on an overturned
drum of a flammable chemical was sufficient to
convict the defendant of burglary and arson.
State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d 892 (Utah 1986).
Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction, where a neighbor positively
identified him fleeing from the victim's house
and noted the license plate number of defendant's car. State v. Pacheco, 778 P.2d 26 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).

Instructions.

- Insufficient.
In prosecution for burglary in third degree,
finding of stolen articles in room occupied by
defendant and another was insufficient to connect defendant with crime. State v. Crawford,
59 Utah 39, 201 P. 1030 (1921).
In prosecution for burglary in third degree,
fact that defendant had attempted to escape
from officers at time he was charged with crime
of robbery was not indicative of guilt of burglary for which accused was subsequently tried.
State v. Crawford, 59 Utah 39, 201 P. 1030
(1921).

-Elements of offense.
If instructions did not properly reflect
accused's theory, judgment of conviction was to
be reversed; if defendant at time of entering
believed he had right to property he intended to
take, he would not be guilty. State v. Evans, 74
Utah 389, 396, 279 P. 950 (1929).
In prosecution for second degree burglary,
even though court's instruction and answers to
questions on effect of intoxication were long
and repetitious and went further than statutory requirement they were not prejudicial;
court's statement "If he is so stupidly drunk
that he doesn't know anything, you just as well•
bting in a verdict of not guilty" did not require
such drunkenness for finding of not guilty, but
this verdict had to follow finding of such condition. State v. Hartley, 16 Utah 2d 123, 396 P.2d
749 (1964).

-Sufficient.
Possession of recently stolen tools, coupled
with circumstances inconsistent with innocence, such as hiding or concealing them, or of
making false, improbable or unsatisfactory explanation of possession, could be sufficient to
connect possessor with offense of third degree
burglary and justify his conviction; such possession must have been recent, not too remote
in point of time from crime, personal, and
exclusive although it could be joint if definite,

-Lesser included offense.
It was not error for the court, at trial of
defendant on a charge of attempted burglary, to
refuse to instruct the jury on the offense of
possession of an instrument for burglary or
theft, as defined by § 76-6-205, since that offense was not necessarily embraced within the
crime of burglary. State v. Sunter, 550 P.2d 184
(Utah i976).
Defendant was not entitled to an instruction
on theft at his trial for burglary where there

Evidence.
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was no evidence to provide a rational basis for
acquitting him of burglary and convicting him
of theft. State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113 (Utah 1986).

-Presumptions.
The language of Subsection 76-6-402(1), relating to the presumption arising from possession of recently stolen property, should not be
used in any form to instruct juries in theft and
burglary cases. State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043
(Utah 1987).
Intent.
Intent to steal may be inferred from circumstances even though nothing is actually taken.
State v. Tellay, 7 Utah 2d 308, 324 P.2d 490
(1958); State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 363, 359
P.2d 486 (1961); State v. Clements, 26 Utah 2d
298, 488 P.2d 1044 (1971).
When one breaks and enters a building in the
nighttime, without consent, an inference may
be drawn that he did so to commit larceny; fact
that nothing is missing when the suspect is
apprehended does not destroy the inference of
intent to steal at the time of entry. State v.
Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856 (Utah 1981).
A defendant's intent to commit theft can be
inferred from evidence that he broke a window
to gain entry into a locked building, even
though nothing was missing when he was apprehended. State v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 1058
(Utah 1985).
In a prosecution for aggravated burglary,
evidence that the defendant was found with his
head, hands, and arms intruding through a
window into an apartment, with an open pocket
knife in his hand, together with his admission
that his intent was to find a place to sleep or to
get warm and that he intended to take a
blanket if he found one, was sufficient to support the conclusion that he had the requisite
intent to commit theft. State v. Isaacson, 704
P.2d 555 (Utah 1985).
In a prosecution for aggravated burglary of
an apartment, burglary of a laundry room, and
theft, the jury was at liberty to infer from the
fact that the defendant had entered the laundry room to commit a theft, that such may have
been his intent when he later entered the
apartment. State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah
1985).
While the mere unlawful entry into private
premises may not alone support a finding of
intent, defendant's unexplained possession of
another's property, his subsequent statements
and conduct, and other unrebutted evidence of
the surrounding circumstances supported the
reasonable inference that defendant entered or
remained in a convenience store office with the
specific intent to commit theft. State v. Pitts,
728 P.2d 113 (Utah 1986).
Evidence supported inference of intent to
commit burglary, where apartment door was
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locked when tenants left but open when they
returned, and defendant was found inside,
standing near a bedroom door. State v. Johnson,
771 P.2d 1071 (1989).

Intoxication.
Since second degree burglary involved intent
to commit larceny, if on account of voluntary
intoxication accused did not have necessary
intent, jury should have taken into consideration evidence of intoxication in determining
existence of such intent. State v. Hartley, 16
Utah 2d 123, 396 P.2d 749 (1964).
Larceny and burglary.
One who entered garage with intent to steal,
and stole automobile worth sufficient amount
to make crime grand larceny, was properly
convicted of both third degree burglary and
grand larceny; since larceny was accomplished
merely by taking personal property with intent
to steal, the same facts did not constitute burglary and larceny. Rogerson v. Harris, 111 Utah
330, 178 P.2d 397 (1947).
Where facts in criminal prosecution showed
breaking and entering and larceny, and entering and larceny were independent, each offense
required different acts, and defendant was
properly convicted of both burglary and larceny.
State v. Jones, 13 Utah 2d 35, 368 P.2d 262
(1962).
Separate offenses.
Defendant committed two separate burglaries when he broke into two separately secured
parts (a laundry room and an apartment) of an
apartment building and stole money from both
places. State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah
1985).
Structures subject to burglary.
Rabbit pens permanently constructed on defendant's home premises were within kind of
structures that could be burglarized under statute that included "outhouse, or other building"
in structures subject to burglary. State v.
Terrell, 55 Utah 314, 186 P. 108, 25 A.L.R. 497
(1919).
Theft distinguished.
While there is some overlap in the offenses of
burglary and theft, as each requires the intent
of depriving another of property, burglary does
not involve unauthorized control over that
property. Therefore, burglary may be committed without having committed theft. Since a
conviction for burglary does not exclude a conviction for theft, a person can constitutionally
be convicted of both offenses. Duran v. Cook,
788 P.2d 1038 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Cited in State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192 (Utah
1985); State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah
1987); State v. Parker, 834 P.2d 592 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. -

§ 10.

13 Am. Jur. 2d Burglary

C.J.S. - 12A C.J.S. Burglary § 5.
A.L.R. - Breaking and entering of inner
door of building as burglary, 43 A.L.R.3d 1147.
Criminal prosecution based upon breaking

76-6-203.

Aggravated

into or taking money or goods from vending
machine or other coin-operated machine, 45
A.L.R.3d 1286.
Maintainability of burglary charge, where
entry into building is made with consent, 58
A.L.R.4th 335.

burglary.

(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, or
fleeing from a burglary the actor or another participant in the crime:
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the
crime;
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against
any person who is not a participant in the crime; or
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon.
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony.
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition as
under Section 76-1-601.

History: C. 1953, 76-6-203, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-203; 1988, ch. 174, § 1;
1989, ch. 170, § 6.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Judgment.

ANALYSIS

-Effect of error.
Although the trial court's oral judgment of
"aggravated burglary, a third degree felony"
was in error as not conforming to the charge,
the jury verdict, or the statute, because defendant's conviction was properly corrected in the
subsequent written judgment there was no
basis to amend the written judgment to conform to the oral judgment. Parry v. State, 837
P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

Bodily injury.
Evidence.
-Sufficient.
Intent.
Judgment.
- Effect of error.
Lesser included offense.
Liability of all participants.
Sentencing.
-Consideration of uncharged allegations.
Weapon.
- Possession.
Cited.

Bodily injury.
Defendant caused "bodily injury" under this
section when he struck victim in the mouth
with a closed fist, knocking him off balance and
drawing blood. State v. Boone, 820 P.2d 930
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Evidence.
-Sufficient.
Evidence was sufficient to prove the criminal
intent required for aggravated burglary. State
v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (1989).
Intent.
See notes under this catchline at

§

76-6-202.

Lesser included offense.
Aggravated assault constituted a lesser and
included offense of aggravated burglary, where
the jury was instructed that to find defendant
guilty of aggravated burglary it must find that
he used or threatened the immediate use of a
dangerous or deadly weapon against a person
and the jury was not required to find any
additional elements to convict defendant of
aggravated assault once it had found him guilty
of aggravated burglary. State v. Bradley, 752
P.2d 874 (Utah 1988).
Liability of all participants.
A defendant was properly charged with aggravated burglary based on the fact that another participant in the crime was knowingly in
possession of a dangerous weapon. State v.
Seel, 827 P.2d 954 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied,
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836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).

Sentencing.
-Consideration
of uncharged
allegations.
Trial court had discretion to consider reliable
information as to defendant's sexual assault
during commission of burglary, although he
had not been charged with the assault. State v.
Sweat, 722 P.2d 746 (Utah 1986).
Weapon.
Subsection (l)(b) deals with two distinct concepts: use of a dangerous weapon and the
threat to use a dangerous weapon. In adopting
this subsection, the legislature intended to prohibit individuals from using or from threaten-

76-6-205

ing to use dangerous weapons during the
course of burglaries. Use or display of a weapon
is not required; threat of such use is sufficient.
State v. Hartmann, 783 P.2d 544 (Utah 1989).

-Possession.
A loaded pistol on the back seat of the vehicle
of defendants fleeing from burglaries satisfied
the requirements of this section pertaining to
possession of a weapon. State v. Seel, 827 P.2d
954 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied, 836 P.2d 1383
(Utah 1992).
Cited in State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah
1986); State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988);
State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 1988); State
v. Brooks, 833 P.2d 362 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. - Fact that gun was unloaded as
affecting criminal responsibility, 68 A.L.R.4th
507.

76-6-204. Burglary of a vehicle - Charge of other offense.
(1) Any person who unlawfully enters any vehicle with intent to commit a
felony or theft is guilty of a burglary of a vehicle.
(2) Burglary of a vehicle is a class A misdemeanor.
(3) A charge against any person for a violation of Subsection (1) shall not
preclude a charge for a commission of any other offense.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-204, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-204.

Cross-References, - Forcible felony involving a vehicle, § 76-2-402(3).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited in Salt Lake City v. Grotepas, 874 P.2d
136 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. - Burglary, breaking, or entering of
motor vehicle, 72 A.L.R.4th 710.

76-6-205. Manufacture or possession
burglary or theft.

of instrument

for

Any person who manufactures or possesses any instrument, tool, device,
article, or other thing adapted, designed, or commonly used in advancing or
facilitating the commission of any offense under circumstances manifesting an
intent to use or knowledge that some person intends to use the same in the
commission of a burglary or theft is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-205, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-205.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS

Lesser included offense.
In prosecution for attempted burglary it was
not error refuse to instruct jury with respect to
the offense defined by this section, since it is

not necessarily a lesser included offense of
burglary. State v. Sunter, 550 P.2d 184 (Utah
1976).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. -

§ 74.

13 Am. Jur. 2d Burglary

C.J.S. - 12A C.J.S. Burglary §§ 43 to 48.
A.L.R. - Validity, construction, and applica-

76-6-206.

tion of statutes relating to burglars' tools, 33
A.L.R.3d 798.
Key Numbers. - Burglary ¢:> 12.

Criminal trespass.

(1) For purposes of this section "enter" means intrusion of the entire body.
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not
amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204:
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and:
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to
any property, including the use of graffiti as defined in Subsection
78-11-20(2);
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the
safety of another; or
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or remains on
property as to which notice against entering is given by:
(i) personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone
with apparent authority to act for the owner;
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders;
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of
intruders.
(3) (a) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a class C misdemeanor unless it
was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a class B misdemeanor.
(b) A violation of Subsection (2)(b) is an infraction.
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the:
(a) property was open to the public when the actor entered or remained;
and
(b) actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with the owner's use
of the property.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-206, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-206; 1974, ch. 32, § 15;
1992, ch. 14, § 2.
Amendment Notes. - The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, added "including
the use of graffiti as defined in Subsection
78-11-20(2)" to Subsection (2)(a)(i); added the
(a) and (b) designations in Subsection (3); and

made stylistic changes throughout.
Cross-References. - Aircraft, tampering
with, § 2-1-30.
Airports and equipment, tampering with forbidden, § 2-1-31.
Wrongful taking of ore from mine, damages,
§ 40-1-12.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
P.2d 433 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
A question of fact existed as to whether a
privately owned and operated skilled nursing
home facility was "open" to plaintiff. Steele v.
Breinholt, 747 P.2d 433 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

ANALYSIS

Burglary.
Defenses.
- Property open to public.
Elements of offense.
-"Enclosure."
Cited.
Burglary.
Where defendant was caught in act of peeling
safe in closed supermarket, offense was burglary; court could not reasonably have given
instructions on offense of unlawful entry with
intent to damage, injure or annoy, and jury
could not reasonably have found defendant
guilty thereof, because defendant's intent must
have been something other than damaging
property, or injuring or annoying a person.
State v. Dodge, 18 Utah 2d 63, 415 P.2d 212
(1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1013, 87 S. Ct.
726, 17 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1967).
Defenses.
-Property open to public.
"Property . . . open to the public" in Subsection (4) is not limited to public, i.e., government-owned property. Steele v. Breinholt, 747

Elements of offense.
Under this section a person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not
amounting to burglary, he enters or remains
unlawfully on property and intends to commit
any crime, other than theft or a felony; therefore, it was error for trial court to instruct jury
that it would amount to criminal trespass for
the defendant to unlawfully enter or remain on
the property with the intention to commit the
specific crime of production of a controlled substance, which is a felony. State v. Lesley, 672
P.2d 79 (Utah 1983).
-"Enclosure."
The general word "enclosure" in Subsection
(2)(b)(ii) is restricted to a sense analagous to
the less general word "fence." State v. Wilson,
701 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1985).
Cited in State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah
1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. § 162 et seq.

C.J.S. - 87 C.J.S. Trespass§

75 Am. Jur. 2d Trespass

144.

PART3
ROBBERY
76-6-301. Robbery.
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of personal property in
the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his
will, accomplished by means of force or fear.
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-301, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-301.

Cross-References. - Assault, § 76-5-102.
Attempt, § 76-4-101.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Attempt.
Evidence.
-Sufficiency.
-Testimony.
Intent.

Taking of property.
Threats.
Cited.
Attempt.
Trial court's failure to instruct that in order
to convict of attempted robbery the jury must
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find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant's conduct constituted a "substantial step"
toward commission of the offense and that the
substantial step must be "strongly corroborative" of defendant's intent to commit the offense
was reversible error. State v. Harmon, 712 P.2d
291 (Utah 1986).

Evidence.
-Sufficiency.
Possession of stolen property alone was not
sufficient to sustain conviction for robbery, but
its quality as evidence was of such high degree
that even slight corroborative proof of other
inculpatory circumstances would warrant conviction offelony murder based on intent to rob.
State v. Boyland, 27 Utah 2d 268, 495 P.2d 315
(1972).
Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for robbery. See State v.
Ulibarri, 668 P.2d 568 (Utah 1983) (theft from
convenience store).
-Testimony.
In prosecution for robbery, based on defendant's alleged act of taking money from person
and presence of another, where defense was
that, if defendant actually was guilty of the act,
he took money under claim of ownership and in
honest belief that he had right to it, defendant
had the right to testify as to his intent, belief,
and motive at time of alleged robbery; it was
error for trial court to refuse to permit him to
answer question, asked while he was testifying
in his own behalf, as to whether at time when
he allegedly took the money, he honestly believed money was his and that he had a right to
take it. People v. Hughes, 11 Utah 100, 39 P.
492 (1895).

Intent.
In determining whether the defendant had
an intent to commit robbery, the jury was
entitled to resort to reasonable inferences
based upon an examination of all the surrounding circumstances. State v. Gutierrez, 714 P.2d
295 (Utah 1986).
Taking of property.
Defendant who, at gunpoint, demanded
money from cashier of motel and then after
picking up money turned to walk out of motel
but was seized near doorway, subdued and
forced to drop the money had sufficiently
asportated the money to complete the crime of
robbery; escape to place of temporary safety
was not necessary to completion of crime. State
v. Roberts, 30 Utah 2d 407, 518 P.2d 1246
(1974).
Threats.
Where the victim was not misled by the use of
a firearm or a facsimile thereof, but rather by
defendant's threatening words and gestures,
while this certainly satisfies the elements of
robbery which must be accomplished by means
of force and fear, a second-degree felony, it does
not satisfy the elements of aggravated robbery.
State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987)
(reducing conviction to robbery and remanding
for resentencing).
Cited in State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990); State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 310
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Germonto, 868
P.2d 50 (Utah 1993); Parsons v. Barnes, 871
P.2d 516 (Utah 1994).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 67 Am. Jur. 2d Robbery § 1.
C.J.S. - 77 C.J.S. Robbery§ 3.
A.L.R. - Earlier prosecution for offense dur-

ing which homicide was committed as bar to
prosecution for homicide, 11 A.L.R.3d 834.
Purse snatching as robbery or theft, 42
A.L.R.3d 1381.

76-6-302.

Prosecution for robbery of one person as bar
to subsequent prosecution for robbery of another person committed at the same time, 51
A.L.R.3d 693.
Key Numbers. - Robbery <S=>1.

Aggravated robbery.

(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
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(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the
course of committing a robbery''ifit occurs in an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a
robbery.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-302, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-302; 1975, ch. 51, § 1;
1989, ch. 170, § 7; 1994, ch. 271, § 1.

Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, added Subsection
(l)(c).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
knife, facsimile thereof, or another deadly
weapon, or the accused causes serious bodily
injury, the elements of aggravated robbery are
satisfied. State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah
1988); State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 670 (1989).

ANALYSIS

Elements of offense.
Entrapment defense unavailable.
Evidence.
- Insufficient.
- Prior convictions.
-Sufficient.
Eyewitness identification.
Included offense.
Indictment or information.
Intent.
Recent possession of stolen property.
Recoveryof property by force.
Sentence.
- Use of a firearm.
Threatening to use weapon.
Unloaded firearm.
Cited.

Entrapment defense unavailable.
Defendant, charged with aggravated robbery
under Subsection (l)(a), was not entitled to the
defense of entrapment, because the threat of
bodily injury, which precludes entrapment, was
a necessarily implied element of the offense
charged. State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062 (Utah
1988).
Evidence.

Elements of offense.
In prosecution for robbery with revolver,
based on defendant's alleged act of taking
moneyfrom another, where defense was that, if
defendant actually was guilty of the act, he took
money under claim of ownership and in honest
belief that he had right to it as result of card
game, it was error for court to give instruction
whereby jury was authorized to convict defendant notwithstanding absence of felonious intent. People v. Hughes, 11 Utah 100, 39 P. 492
(1895).
All essential elements were proved where
evidenceshowed defendant took $120 on March
10 though charged with taking $140 on March
9, and where the victim testified the defendant
had a gun stuck in the front of his jeans but
evidence did not show defendant handled or
pointed a gun and the gun was not found after
the robbery. The date charged need only be
closelyproximated, the value of personal property taken is not an element of robbery, and
proof that the gun was actually pointed and
placing the gun in evidence are not necessary
since if mere exhibition of a gun places the
victim in fear it constitutes "use of a firearm."
In re R.G.B., 597 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1979).
Proof of all elements necessary to prove a
robbery is not required; so long as there is an
attempt, coupled with the use of a firearm,

-Insufficient.
Defendant's conviction was reversed, because
the circumstantial evidence connecting him to
his alleged accomplice and the crime was insufficient to prove that he was with the accomplice
during or immediately after the robbery or that
he had the requisite mental state for the crime
with which he was charged. State v. Kalisz, 735
P.2d 60 (Utah 1987).
Defendant's menacing gesture accompanied
by verbal threats was not sufficient evidence
alone to establish the use of a firearm or a
facsimile of a firearm. State v. Suniville, 741
P.2d 961 (Utah 1987).
- Prior convictions.
Admission of evidence of defendant's previous convictions for burglary and robbery was
prejudicial error, where the evidence of his guilt
was far from overwhelming and one of the
identification witnesses was involved in the
robbery and had questionable motives for identifying defendant. State v. Lanier, 778 P.2d 9
(Utah 1989).
-Sufficient.
Positive identification of defendant and his
clothing by robbery victim, and defendant's
fresh thumb print on a poster which defendant
had handled while in the place he robbed,
sustained trial court's finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. In re R.G.B., 597 P.2d 1333
(Utah 1979).
Evidence supported conviction of defendant
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who accosted the victim with a knife and club
and demanded to know where she kept her
silver and gold. State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591
(Utah 1988).
Erroneous admission of defendant's prior
convictions of retail theft and attempted burglary was harmless, where the state presented
sufficient evidence and eyewitness testimony to
prove that defendant committed the robbery.
State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (1989).
Evidence, upon which the jury could reasonably find that the defendant solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided another person in the aggravated
robbery of a jewelry store with the requisite
intent, was sufficient to support the defendant's
conviction of aggravated robbery. State v. Webb,
790 P.2d 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
There was sufficient evidence for the jury
reasonably to find that the defendant committed the crime of aggravated robbery, where two
witnesses positively identified the defendant as
the robber, and a hat and a coat found inside
the stolen car used in the robbery matched the
witnesses' description of the clothing worn by
the robber. State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Evidence was sufficient to support conviction
of robbery notwithstanding one eyewitness's
initial identification of another person as robber. See State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993).

Eyewitness identification.
Although the only evidence convicting defendant of aggravated robbery was the eyewitness
identification of the victim, it was not prejudicial error for the trial coqrt to refuse to instruct
the jury as to the special pitfalls of eyewitness
identification. State v. Newton, 681 P.2d 833
(Utah 1984).
Included offense.
Grand larceny conviction was improper when
accompanied by conviction of robbery (with
pistol) for same conduct since grand larceny
was included offense in robbery charge. State v.
Montayne, 18 Utah 2d 38, 414 P.2d 958, cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 939, 87 S. Ct. 305, 17 L. Ed. 2d
218 (1966).
Under the test for separateness found in
Subsection 76-1-402(3), aggravated robbery becomes a lesser included offense of first degree
felony murder when the predicate felony for
first degree murder is aggravated robbery.
State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986).
Aggravated robbery is one of the predicate
offenses offelony murder. State v. McCovey,803
P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990).
Indictment or information.
Information for robbery (with firearm apparently in pocket of robber) that used the word
"robbed" sufficiently informed accused of nature

and cause of accusation, at least in absence of
demand for bill of particulars; there was but
one crime of robbery, and words such as "by
means of force or fear" were unnecessary. State
v. Robbins, 102 Utah 119, 127 P.2d 1042 (1942).
In prosecution for robbery (by force of arms),
variance between complaint filed in city court
and information filed in district court as to
ownership of property taken was not fatal
where both alleged that defendant took property from possession or presence of same person. State v. Perry, 27 Utah 2d 48, 492 P.2d
1349 (1972).

Intent.
Intent to commit crime of robbery (using
firearms) or assault with intent to commit murder could be found from proof of facts from
which it reasonably could have been believed
that such was intent of defendant, because
additional facts may be inferred from those
shown directly by evidence. State v. Kazda, 15
Utah 2d 313, 392 P.2d 486 (1964).
Recent possession of stolen property.
Statute making unexplained recent possession of stolen property prima facie evidence of
larceny applied to offense of robbery when
larceny and robbery were committed in same
transaction. State v. Donovan, 77 Utah 343, 294
P. 1108 (1931).
Recovery of property by force.
Defendant, even if he took money from another by force or fear, was not guilty of robbery
(with revolver), regardless of whatever other
offense he might have committed in taking of
money, if money actually belonged to him, and
its possession by person from whom it was
taken was wrongful since, in such case, animus
furandi element of robbery was lacking. People
v. Hughes, 11 Utah 100, 39 P. 492 (1895).
Sentence.
- Use of a firearm.
The legislature's 1975 amendment of the
aggravated robbery statute to specify use of a
firearm, coupled with the subsequent enactment of the general sentence enhancement provisions, created no ambiguity over what penalty the legislature intended for robbery
committed with a firearm. The legislature was
merely increasing the degree of a robbery committed with the enumerated instruments of
violence. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
Threatening to use weapon.
Threatening to use a dangerous weapon during the commission of a robbery, regardless of
whether one actually possesses such a weapon,
is sufficient for a charge of aggravated robbery
under this section. State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 310
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).
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Unloaded firearm.
Aggravated robbery may be committed with
an unloaded firearm. State v. Turner, 572 P.2d
387 (Utah 1977).
Cited in State v. Ortiz, 712 P.2d 218
1985); State v. DeJesus, 712 P.2d 246
1985); State v. Gutierrez, 714 P.2d 295
1986); State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261

(Utah
(Utah
(Utah
(Utah
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1986); State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375 (Utah
1986); State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah
1988); State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819 (1989);
State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990);
State v. Severance, 828 P.2d 1066 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992); State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 67 Am. Jur. 2d Robbery § 3.
C.J.S. - 77 C.J.S. Robbery § 27.
A.L.R. - Fact that gun was unloaded as
affecting criminal responsibility, 68 A.L.R.4th
507.

Admissibility of expert opm1on stating
whether a particular knife was, or could have
been, the weapon used in a crime, 83 A.L.R.4th
660.
Key Numbers. - Robbery <!=> 11.

PART4
THEFT
76-6-401. Definitions.
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and birds,
written instruments or other writings representing or embodying rights
concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise containing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature
such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and trade
secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or technical
information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention which the
owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him.
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property,
whether to the obtainer or another; in relation to labor or services, to
secure performance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction.
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or
to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other
compensation; or
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it
unlikely that the owner will recover it.
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not necessarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law
larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee,
and embezzlement.
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression oflaw or
fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that
is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or
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(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor
previously created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to
affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not now believe
to be true; or
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his
judgment in the transaction; or
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without
disclosing a lien, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal
impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the lien,
security interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is or is not
a matter of official record; or
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of
another in the transaction, which performance the actor does not
intend to perform or knows will not be performed; provided, however,
that failure to perform the promise in issue without other evidence of
intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not intend
to perform or knew the promise would not be performed.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-401, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-401.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
of deception. State v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681
(Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied, 843 P.2d 1042
(Utah 1992).

ANALYSIS

Deception.
Purpose to deprive.
Cited.
Deception.
Subsection (a) in the definition of "deception"
only applies to impressions of fact that are false
at some present time; unfulfilled promises of
future performance do not suffice as false representations under that subsection. State v.
Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983).
Under Subsection (b) in the definition of
"deception," the previously created or confirmed
impression of fact must be false when the
property is obtained in order to constitute "deception." State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061 (Utah
1983).
Under Subsection (e) in the definition of
"deception," a promise of future performance
can constitute deception when the promising
party does not intend to perform or knows the
promise will not be performed; a person knows
that a promise will not be performed when he is
aware that the promise is reasonably certain
not to be performed. State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d
1061 (Utah 1983).
Defendant's false representations to a bank
employee about his account and line of credit at
other banks were sufficient to support finding

Purpose to deprive.
Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's intent to deprive owner of his automobile
where defendant drove the automobile in excess of 100 miles per hour when fleeing from
police; told police when stopped that he owned
the automobile; damaged the automobile by
misuse; and drove the car from Utah to California without ever stating he would return the
automobile to Utah. State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d
880 (Utah 1978).
The defendant's "purpose to deprive" was
inferred from the following facts: in 1984, defendant began borrowing small amounts of
money from the victim to buy pet food; the
victim's generosity prompted defendant to
make subsequent requests for larger sums to
pay for everything from automobile repairs to
medical bills; with each request, defendant inevitably promised to repay the victim soon or by
a specific date; and between 1984 and 1986,
defendant borrowed over $70,000 and repaid
only about $1,500. State v. Fowler, 745 P.2d 472
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Cited in Stevens v. Sanpete County, 640 F.
Supp. 376 (D. Utah 1986).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Utah's New Penal
Code: Theft, 1973 Utah L. Rev. 718.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 50 Am. J ur. 2d Larceny § 1.
C.J.S. - 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 1(1).
A.L.R. - Criminal liability for theft of, interference with, or unauthorized use of, computer programs, files, or systems, 51 A.L.R.4th
971.

76-6-402.

Presumptions

Cat as subject of larceny, 55 A.L.R.4th 1080.
What is "trade secret" so as to render actionable under state law its use or disclosure by
former employee, 59 A.L.R.4th 641.
Key Numbers. - Larceny
1.

=

and defenses.

The following presumption shall be applicable to this part:
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence
that the person in possession stole the property.
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in the
property or service stolen if another person also has an interest that the
actor is not entitled to infringe, provided an interest in property for
purposes of this subsection shall not include a security interest for the
repayment of a debt or obligation.
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor:
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service
involved; or
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or
exercise control over the property or service as he did; or
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or service
honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have consented.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-402, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-402; 1974, ch. 32, § 16.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
not infringe on the defendants' constitutional
right to remain silent, since nothing in the
instruction required testimony by the defendants, because an explanation of possession
could have been made by the testimony of other
witnesses or by other evidence. State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321 (Utah 1985).
Use of the inference raised by possession of
recently stolen property does not offend the
federal constitution. State v. Graves, 717 P.2d
717 (Utah 1986).
Subsection (1) does not force a defendant to
take the stand in violation of his Fifth Amendment right not to take the stand to testify. State
v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1986).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Applicability to other offenses.
Effect of presumption.
Evidence.
Explanation of possession.
Instructions.
-Good faith.
-Other offenses.
-Verbatim use of Subsection (1).
Possession as corroborating evidence.
Possession defined.
Prima facie evidence.
Questions of law and fact.
Uncorroborated explanation of possession.
Constitutionality.
Prima facie evidence provision was not invalid as encroachment by legislature upon
perogatives of judiciary. State v. Potello, 40
Utah 56, 119 P. 1023 (1911).
Ajury instruction based on Subsection (1) did

Applicability to other offenses.
Recent possession of stolen property, when
not satisfactorily explained, was also prima
facie evidence of guilt of burglary or robbery, at
least when larceny, burglary and robbery had
been committed in same transaction. State v.
Donovan, 77 Utah 343, 294 P. 1108 (1931).
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The presumption that a person in possession
of recently stolen property stole the property
when no satisfactory explanation of the possession is made applies to burglary cases. State v.
Sessions, 583 P.2d 44 (Utah 1978).

Effect of presumption.
Provision that unexplained possession of recently stolen property was prima facie evidence
of guilt in prosecution for larceny did not relieve state of burden of convicting defendant
upon all the evidence by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Barretta, 47 Utah 479, 155
P. 343 (1916); State v. Merritt, 67 Utah 325,247
P. 497 (1926).
Possession of articles recently stolen, when
coupled with circumstances of hiding or concealing them, or of disposing or attempting to
dispose of them, or of making false or unreasonable or unsatisfactory explanations of possession, could be sufficient to connect possessor
with commission of offense of larceny; but mere
possession, when not coupled with other
culpatory or incriminating circumstances, did
not alone suffice to justify conviction. State v.
Kinsey, 77 Utah 348, 295 P. 247 (1931); State v.
Dyett, 114 Utah 379, 199 P.2d 155 (1948).
Fact of possession of stolen property together
with lack of satisfactory explanation was matter which jury could consider in its determination of whether state had met burden of proving
defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
State v. Little, 5 Utah 2d 42, 296 P.2d 289, cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 859, 1 L. Ed. 2d 66, 77 S. Ct. 83
(1956).
Mere possession ofrecently stolen property is
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of theft
unless the defendant offers some explanation of
his possession, in which case the state has the
burden of proving the explanation as unsatisfactory before the presumption of theft arises.
State v. Jolley, 571 P.2d 582 (Utah 1977).
Proof of possession of recently stolen property constitutes only prima facie evidence of the
identity of the possessor as the thief; this section does not create a presumption, permissive
or otherwise, regarding the credibility or
weight of the evidence so created nor does it
shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant.
State v. Asay, 631 P.2d 861 (Utah 1981).
Subsection (1) is addressed to the court, not
to the jury, and its sole purpose is to provide a
standard by which to determine whether the
evidence admitted at trial warrants submission
of the case to the jury. State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d
192 (Utah 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 813, 107
S. Ct. 64, 93 L. Ed. 2d 22 (1986).
Evidence.
State's failure to identify goods found in defendant's possession as stolen goods disposed of
case, for without identification jury could not
draw inference of guilt from possession of re-

cently stolen property. State v. Hall, 105 Utah
162, 145 P.2d 494 (1944).
Evidence was sufficient to lay proper foundation for introduction in evidence of $1,000 in
twenty-dollar bills which were found in defendant's possession even though prosecution
failed to identify biJls found in defendant's
possession as identical bilJs that were stolen.
State v. Crowder, 114 Utah 202, 197 P.2d 917
(1948).
Defendant's attempts to alter the appearance
of the stolen vehicle constituted the necessary
corroboration, and together with defendant's
possession of the vehicle six days after it was
reported stolen, constituted sufficient evidence
to support a conviction of auto theft. State v.
Clayton, 658 P.2d 621 (Utah 1983).
Defendant's possession of a stolen automobile
six days after it was reported stolen could be
considered as evidence that defendant stole the
automobile; defendant's possession was not so
remote in time from the theft to preclude it
from consideration as evidence. State v.
Clayton, 658 P.2d 621 (Utah 1983).
Under possession of stolen property provision, state need not have presented direct proof
identifying defendant as thief or directly connecting him with felonious taking or asportation; the legislature deemed possession of recently stolen property, without satisfactory
explanation, as sufficient to support conviction.
State v. Gellatly, 22 Utah 2d 149, 449 P.2d 993
(1969).

Explanation of possession.
"Satisfactory" in former definition of larceny
meant an explanation that would cause a reasonable person under all circumstances to believe in its sufficiency; it was such an explanation that court was persuaded in its own mind
thereby that possession was lawfully accounted
for. State v. Brooks, 101 Utah 584, 126 P.2d
1044 (1942).
Where defendant's explanation did not meet
requirements of former definition of larceny or
did not persuade court to repose sufficient confidence therein, to relieve mind from doubt or
uncertainty, it was proper to submit cause to
jury to determine, not satisfactoriness of defendant's explanation, but question of his guilt in
light of all evidence including his explanation if
he had made any. State v. Brooks, 101 Utah
584, 126 P.2d 1044 (1942).
Former statute, which provided that possession of property recently stolen should be
deemed prima facie evidence of guilt, controlled
despite defendant's contention that no one had
asked him to explain his possession, where
defendant was convicted of burglary and larceny. State v. Martinez, 21 Utah 2d 187, 442
P.2d 943 (1968).
State was not required to show that defendant failed to make satisfactory explanation to
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arresting officer of possession of recently stolen
property. State v. Heath, 27 Utah 2d 13, 492
P.2d 978 (1972).

Instructions.
-Good faith.
In a prosecution for theft, instructions taken
directly from Subsection (3) of this section were
adequate to address fully the good faith concept
and the trial court properly refused to give an
instruction proffered by defendant. State v.
Larsen, 876 P.2d 391 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
-Other offenses.
Defendant was not entitled to an instruction
on theft at his trial for burglary where there
was no evidence to provide a rational basis for
acquitting him of burglary and convicting him
of theft. State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113 (Utah 1986).
-Verbatim use of Subsection (1).
Although a jury instruction using the language of Subsection (1) was improper because it
directly related to the issue of guilt and relieved
the state of its burden of proof, this statutory
language itself is not unconstitutional, since it
is addressed to the court and merely provides a
standard by which to determine whether the
evidence presented warrants submission to the
jury. State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321 (Utah
1985).
Instruction of the jury by a verbatim recitation of Subsection (1) is unconstitutional because the instruction directly relates to the
issue of guilt and relieves the state of its burden
of proof by use of a mandatory rebuttable
presumption. State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192
(Utah 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 813, 107 S.
Ct. 64, 93 L. Ed. 2d 22 (1986).
Although the trial court should not have used
the statutory language in a jury instruction,
the instruction could not be deemed reversible
error in light of clear explanatory instructions
that all that the jury could make of the term
"prima facie" was a permissible inference. State
v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1986).
The language of Subsection (1) should not be
used in any form to instruct juries in theft and
burglary cases. State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043
(Utah 1987).
Possession as corroborating evidence.
Possession of stolen property was sufficient
corroboration of testimony of accomplice to support conviction of defendant or larceny and
burglary. State v. Vigil, 123 Utah 495, 260 P.2d
539 (1953).
Possession defined.
Possession meant conscious, personal possession, amounting to express or implied assertion
ofownership. State v. Butterfield, 70 Utah 529,
261 P. 804 (1927).
Possession must not only have been personal,

76-6-402

exclusive, and unexplained, but must also have
been a conscious assertion of possession by
accused. State v. Kinsey, 77 Utah 348, 295 P.
247 (1931).
Possession meant "conscious possession."
State v. Brooks, 101 Utah 584, 126 P.2d 1044
(1942).
Possession must have been personal, conscious and exclusive; and mere association with
or constructive possession of recently stolen
property, or mere presence of accused at place
where stolen property was found, was insufficient, although it was necessary to show that
accused was in physical possession of such
property. State v. Dyett, 114 Utah 379, 199 P.2d
155 (1948).

Prima facie evidence.
"Prima facie" as used in former § 76-38-1
meant presumptive evidence, and did not mean
that unless rebutted by other evidence, or discredited by circumstances, it became conclusive
offact of guilt. State v. Potello, 40 Utah 56, 119
P. 1023 (1911).
"Prima facie evidence" did not mean that in
absence of other evidence jury must have found
defendant guilty, but rather that there would
have arisen an inference that defendant had
committed larceny and that this inference
could with all other circumstances be considered in determining whether jury was convinced beypnd reasonable doubt of defendant's
guilt. State v. Wood, 2 Utah 2d 34, 268 P.2d 998,
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 900, 75 S. Ct. 221, 99 L.
Ed. 706 (1954); State v. Gellatly, 22 Utah 2d
149, 449 P.2d 993 (1969); State v. Winger, 26
Utah 2d 118, 485 P.2d 1398 (1971).
Questions of law and fact.
Possession could be so remote as to have
required as a matter of law that it was not
sufficiently recent to raise presumption; standing by itself, possession as remote as four
months could hardly have been recent, but
whether it was or not was for jury under all
facts and circumstances of case. State v. Bowen,
45 Utah 130, 143 P. 134 (1914).
What constituted such recent possession as
to have raised the presumption that defendant
did the taking depended upon nature of property and circumstances of particular case and,
therefore, was ordinarily question off act for the
jury. State v. Bowen, 45 Utah 130, 143 P. 134
(1914).
Satisfactoriness of defendant's explanation of
possession of recently stolen property or his
failure to explain, as far as statute was concerned, was for court and not jury. State v.
Brooks, 101 Utah 584, 126 P.2d 1044 (1942).
Under statute which provided that possession of stolen property, when person in possession failed to make satisfactory explanation,
was to be deemed prima facie evidence of guilt,
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jury did not determine if explanation was satisfactory; they determined whether, on all evidence in the case, they were convinced beyond
reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt; ~nd explanation may have been satisfactory to jury
and yet defendant found guilty because other
evidence may have, notwithstanding, convinced them beyond reasonable doubt of his
guilt; explanation may been been satisfactory,
and proved, or admittedly false, and yet jury
could acquit because they were not convinced
beyond reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt.
State v. Brooks, 101 Utah 584, 126 P.2d 1044
(1942).

Uncorroborated explanation of possession.
Evidence was sufficient to support conviction
for grand larceny where recently stolen pistol
was found in car in which defendant was riding
and where defendant's claim that he purchased
pistol several months earlier in bar was not
supported by either direct or circumstantial
evidence. State v. Pappacostas, 17 Utah 2d 197,
407 P.2d 576 (1965).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny§ 10.
C.J.S. - 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 4.
A.L.R. - What amounts to "exclusive" possession of stolen goods to support inference of
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Theft - Evidence

burglary or other felonious taking, 51 A.L.R.3d
727.
Key Numbers. - Larceny
41.

to support accusation.

Conduct denominated theft in this part constitutes a single offense embracing the separate offenses such as those heretofore known as larceny, larceny by
trick, larceny by bailees, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail,
receiving stolen property. An accusation of theft may be supported by evidence
that it was committed in any manner specified in Sections 76-6-404 through
76-6-410, subject to the power of the court to ensure a fair trial by granting a
continuance or other appropriate relief where the conduct of the defense would
be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-403, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-403; 1974, ch. 32, § 17.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Evidence.
Fingerprint evidence, based on a comparison
of defendant's fingerprints with those found at
the scene of the crime, along with the testimony
of defendant's accomplice, was sufficient evidence to find defendant guilty of burglary and
theft. State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985).

ANALYSIS

Embezzlement.
Evidence.
-Prior convictions.
Instructions.
-Good faith.
Pleading and practice.
Receiving stolen property.

Embezzlement.
In a prosecution for theft, since this section
includes the common law embezzlement variation of the crime, and since intent to embezzle
by definition is formed after a person obtains
control over the property, not at the time of
taking, as suggested by defendant, an instruction that "purpose to deprive may be found at
any period of time in which the defendant
exercised unauthorized control over such property" was a proper statement of law. State v.
Larsen, 876 P.2d 391 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

-Prior convictions.
In a prosecution for theft, admission of the
evidence of defendant's prior conviction of securities fraud was proper under U.R.E. 609(a)(2)
since the crime involved "dishonesty or false
statement." State v. Larsen, 876 P.2d 391 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994).
Instructions.
-Good faith.
In a prosecution for theft, instructions taken
directly from § 76-6-402 were adequate to address fully the good faith concept, so the trial

196

OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY

76-6-404

court properly refused to give an instruction
proffered by defendant. State v. Larsen, 876
P.2d 391 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

theft was committed in any manner specified in
§§ 76-6-404 to 76-6-410. State v. Fowler, 745
P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

Pleading and practice.
Section 76-6-404 is the "general offense of
theft" required to be pied by this section to
invoke the provisions of consolidated theft.
Once the prosecution charges a defendant with
the general offense of"theft" under§ 76-6-404,
it may then present its evidence to prove the

Receiving stolen property.
Evidence that establishes receiving stolen
property under § 76-6-408 is sufficient to sustain a conviction of theft without the necessity
of establishing theft by taking. State v. Taylor,
570 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977).

76-6-404. Theft - Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-404, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-404.
Cross-References. - Motor vehicles, spe-

cial anti-theft laws, § 41-la-1308 et seq.
Shoplifting Act, § 78-11-14 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Corpus delicti .
In prosecution for larceny it was not essential
that corpus delicti be established by evidence
independent of that adduced to prove that defendant was perpetrator of crime; the same
evidence could be used to prove both. State v.
Hall, 105 Utah 151, 139 P.2d 228 (1943), rev'd
on other grounds, 105 Utah 162, 145 P.2d 494
(1944).
Corpus delicti for offense of theft consists of
the elements that one entitled to possession of
the property has been deprived of possession
and such deprivation has been accomplished by
a felonious taking; evidence of the property
having been taken from the possession of the
owner without his knowledge or consent is
evidence of both of the elements of the corpus
delicti. State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d 1228 (Utah
1980).

.ANALYSIS

Bailments.
Comment on defendant's silence.
Corpus delicti.
Elements of offense.
Evidence.
- Weight and sufficiency.
Included offenses.
- Possession.
Instructions.
Intent.
Pleading and practice.
Possession of recently stolen property.
"Purpose to deprive."
Separate offenses.
Unauthorized control.
Venue.
Cited.
Bailments.
Bailor could be guilty of stealing his own
property, if done with intent to charge bailee.
State v. Parker, 104 Utah 23, 137 P.2d 626
(1943).
Comment on defendant's silence.
Where defendant charged with theft of building materials from construction site did not
testify in his own defense and offered no evidence to explain his late-night presence at the
site, prosecutor's comment that: "The defense
has presented no evidence as to why defendant
was out there. What was he doing out there?"
was a legitimate comment on what the total
evidence did or did not show; it was not impermissible comment on defendant's failure to testify. State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975).

Elements of offense.
State is not required to prove conclusively
who the real owner of the property is, but only
that defendant obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of another. State
v. Simmons, 573 P.2d 341 (Utah 1977).
This section requires a finding of only one of
two disjunctives, "obtained" or "exercised unauthorized control" over the property of another
with a purpose to deprive him thereof; conviction for theft can be upheld without a finding
that defendant "obtained" the property, so long
as there is a finding that he "exercised unauthorized control" over it. State v. Walker, 649
P.2d 16 (Utah 1982).
Evidence.
Proof of identity of stolen goods could be by
either direct or circumstantial evidence. State
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v. Hall, 105 Utah 151, 139 P.2d 228 (1943), rev'd
on other grounds, 105 Utah 162, 145 P.2d 494
(1944).
In prosecution for grand larceny, plea of not
guilty cast upon state burden of proving every
essential element of offense by evidence sufficient to convince jury beyond reasonable doubt;
judicial notice of value could not stand without
satisfactory evidence of value of property
taken. State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234
P.2d 600 (1951).
Proof of larceny did not require showing that
accused was in possession of property stolen.
State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148, 369 P.2d 494
(1962).

-Weight and sufficiency.
Where lambs claimed to have been stolen
were found a month later in possession of
defendant with altered brands, and defendant
failed to offer satisfactory explanation, there
was sufficient evidence to support verdict of
guilty of offense oflarceny. State v. Kappas, 100
Utah 274, 114 P.2d 205 (1941).
Testimony of undercover man for police that
defendant participated in taking of money was
sufficient to sustain conviction of grand larceny.
State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148, 369 P.2d 494
(1962).
Evidence inter alia that defendants brought
stolen camper to third persons for sale, and
accepted purchase price, was insufficient to
establish guilt, since there was no direct evidence to establish that defendants had taken
camper. State v. George, 25 Utah 2d 330, 481
P.2d 667 (1971).
Evidence that establishes receiving stolen
property under § 76-6-408 is sufficient to sustain a conviction of theft under this section
without the necessity of establishing theft by
taking. State v. Taylor, 570 P.2d 697 (Utah
1977).
In a prosecution for third degree felony theft
of bull, evidence placing defendant near scene
of crime in possession of rifles, in addition to
testimony of witness that he saw defendant
running away from vicinity of slaughtered bull,
was sufficient to sustain conviction. State v.
Sparks, 672 P.2d 92 (Utah 1983).
In a prosecution for aggravated burglary,
evidence that the defendant was found intruding through a window into an apartment, together with his admission that his intent was to
take an item from the apartment, was sufficient
to support the conclusion that he had the requisite intent to commit theft. State v. Isaacson,
704 P.2d 555 (Utah 1985).
Evidence supported defendant's conviction of
theft of funds invested in a condominium
project, where the evidence was not in dispute
as to the date and the amount invested by each
investor named in the information and the date
the sums were deposited in defendant's operat-

ing account. Statev. Snyder, 747 P.2d 417 (Utah
1987).
Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction, where a neighbor positively
identified him fleeing from the victim's house
and noted the license plate number of defendant's car. State v. Pacheco, 778 P.2d 26 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).

Included offenses.
Joy riding (former§ 41-1-109; now see § 41la-1311) is a lesser and included offense of theft
of an operable motor vehicle. State v. Lloyd, 568
P.2d 357 (Utah 1977); State v. Cornish, 568 P.2d
360 (Utah 1977).
Where the taking of personal property established the crime of theft and provided an element of aggravated robbery and, to the extent
that aggravated robbery served as the aggravating circumstance, first degree murder, the
statutory element of taking personal property
is common to both theft and first degree murder, making theft a lesser included offense of
first degree murder. State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d
1301 (Utah 1986).
A conviction for theft did not merge with a
conviction for first degree murder because evidence at the trial was sufficient to prove the
crime of murder in the first degree without
relying on the theft conviction as the aggravating circumstance required for the murder conviction. State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah
1993).
-Possession.
Possession of a stolen vehicle was a lesser
included offense of theft of a vehicle, where the
record did not indicate that the defendant ever
relinquished his claim of ownership or passed
title to the vehicle during the time it had been
left at his brother-in-law's house while the
defendant was serving a prison sentence. State
v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990).
Instructions.
Where accused was charged with taking his
auto from possession of repairman without paying for work already done thereon, lack of
instruction as to amount of indebtedness could
have been not only inadequate, but misleading;
value of goods stolen was measure of grand or
petit larceny. State v. Parker, 104 Utah 23, 137
P.2d 626 (1943).
Where offense of theft of an operable motor
vehicle is charged, and under the circumstances of the case there is either an issue of
whether the prosecution has sustained its burden of proving an intent to deprive the owner of
possession under circumstances in Subsection
76-6-401(3), or the defendant presents evidence
under his theory which negates the factors in
Subsection 76-6-401(3), the issue of defendant's
intent should be submitted to the trier of fact
with a requested instruction on the lesser in-
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eluded offense of joyriding. State v. Chesnut,
621P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980).
The language of Subsection 76-6-402(1), relating to the presumption arising from possession of recently stolen property, should not be
used in any form to instruct juries in theft and
burglary cases. State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043
(Utah 1987).
Intent.
It was necessary to find that intent to steal
existed at time of taking and no subsequent
feloniousintent would suffice. People v. Miller,
4 Utah 410, 11 P. 514 (1886); State v. Allen, 56
Utah 37, 189 P. 84 (1920).
In prosecution for stealing sheep, it was not
necessary to prove that defendant and others
with him had actually intended to convert
sheepto their own use; it was sufficient to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that they had taken
sheep away against will of their owners, with
intention of permanently depriving latter of
their property. State v. McKee, 17 Utah 370, 53
P. 733 (1898).
Obtaining money under pretext of betting at
cards where everything was fixed so that prosecutingwitness had no chance to win, and was
only player who actually risked anything, was
larceny.State v. Donaldson, 35 Utah 96, 99 P.
447, 20 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1164, 136 Am. St. R. 1041
(1909).
In prosecution for larceny, even though defendant did not intend to keep all of owner's
money,and intended to divide with those who
were connected with him in card game, it was
larceny of whole amount. State v. Donaldson,
35 Utah 96, 99 P. 447, 20 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1164, 136
Am.St. R. 1041 (1909).
Intent, a necessary element of crime of larceny, was not always disclosed by what one
said, but could be inferred from what one said
and did, or failed to say and do, in a given
situation, together with other facts and circumstances surrounding transaction. Loper v.
United States, 160 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1947).
Evidencewas sufficient for reasonable minds
to infer that defendant took money with intent
to steal it. State v. Shonka, 3 Utah 2d 124, 279
P.2d711 (1955).
Where defendant who left his car with repairman while owing him for repairs on the car
returned and took car thinking that he had
legal right to do so, defendant's requested instruction that he could not be found guilty ifhe
honestly believed he had right to possession of
car should have been given, and general charge
that he must have had intent to steal was not
sufficient.State v. Cude, 14 Utah 2d 287, 383
P.2d399 (1963).
Felonious intent was sufficiently proven by
evidencethat, on employment by strangers and
without asking for or being shown documents of
ownership,defendant transported house trailer
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from Utah to designated road junction in Montana and there turned it over to another
stranger. State v. Christensen, 27 Utah 2d 212,
494 P.2d 291 (1972).
Pleading and practice.
This section is the "general offense of theft"
required to be pled by§ 76-6-403 to invoke the
provisions of consolidated theft. Once the prosecution charges a defendant with the general
offense of "theft" under this section, it may then
present its evidence to prove the theft was
committed in any manner specified in this
section or §§ 76-6-405 to 76-6-410. State v.
Fowler, 745 P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Defendant's theft in a single burglary of
items listed under different subsections of
§ 76-6-412 was improperly charged as two
separate counts of second degree theft:§ 76-6412 does not establish elements of theft; it
simply categorizes theft for sentencing purposes into various degrees. State v. Casias, 772
P.2d 975 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Possession of recently stolen property.
Defendant's attempts to alter the appearance
of the stolen vehicle constituted the necessary
corroborating evidence, and together with his
possession of the vehicle six days after it was
reported stolen, constituted sufficient evidence
to support a conviction of auto theft. State v.
Clayton, 658 P.2d 621 (Utah 1983).
"Purpose to deprive."
Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's intent to deprive owner of his automobile
where defendant drove the automobile in excess of 100 miles per hour when fleeing from
police; told police when stopped that he owned
the automobile; damaged the automobile by
misuse; and drove the car from Utah to California without ever stating he would return the
automobile to Utah. State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d
880 (Utah 1978).
Separate offenses.
Where facts in criminal prosecution showed
breaking and entering and larceny, and entering was independent of larceny, each offense
required different acts, and defendant was
properly convicted of both burglary and larceny.
State v. Jones, 13 Utah 2d 35, 368 P.2d 262
(1962).
While there is some overlap in the offenses of
burglary and theft, as each requires the intent
of depriving another of property, burglary does
not involve unauthorized control over that
property. Therefore, burglary may be committed without having committed theft. Since a
conviction for burglary does not exclude a conviction for theft, a person may constitutionally
be convicted of both offenses. Duran v. Cook,
788 P.2d 1038 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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not in the partnership's bP,st interests and he
could be convicted of theft for exercising unauthorized control over partnership property.
State v. Larsen, 834 P.2d 586 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).

Unauthorized control.
An item need not be taken from a retailer's
premises to constitute theft of the retailer's
property; exercising unauthorized control over
an item within a retail establishment is sufficient to constitute the crime of theft. State v.
Watts, 639 P.2d 158 (Utah 1981).
The burden is on the state to prove unauthorized control, not on the defendant to prove
authorized control; proof of lack of ownership
alone does not establish unauthorized control.
State v. Franks, 649 P.2d 3 (Utah 1982).
A criminal prosecution of what is essentially
a breach of a real estate sale agreement extends this section too broadly and therefore the
conviction cannot stand. State v. Burton, 800
P.2d 817 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Although a partnership agreement granted
the general partners numerous powers, it contained the limitation that a general partner
exercise those powers only in the best interests
of the partnership; the defendant, a partner,
was thus not authorized to deal with partnership property in a manner that he knew was

Venue.
Venue for an offense under this section is
properly laid in any county where an element of
it occurred; the formation of a specific intent to
convert another's property within a county is
sufficient for venue to be proper there, notwithstanding that the actual conversion took place
in another county. State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775
(Utah 1977).
Cited in State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400
(Utah 1986); In re Jones, 720 P.2d 1356 (Utah
1986); Stevens v. Sanpete County, 640 F. Supp.
376 (D. Utah 1986); State v. Parkin, 742 P.2d
715 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Jamison, 767
P.2d 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hunter,
831 P.2d 1033 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Scott, 860 P.2d 1005 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State
v. Larsen, 876 P.2d 391 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny § 2.
C.J.S. - 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 1(3).
A.L.R. - Larceny: entrapment or consent,
10 A.L.R.3d 1121.
Criminal offenses in connection with rental
of motor vehicles, 38 A.L.R.3d 949.
Criminal prosecution based upon breaking
into or taking money or goods from vending
machine or other coin-operated machine, 45
A.L.R.3d 1286.
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Changing of price tags by patron in selfservice store as criminal offense, 60 A.L.R.3d
1293.
Embezzlement, larceny, false pretenses or
allied criminal fraud by partner, 82 A.L.R.3d
822.
Criminal liability for theft of, interference
with, or unauthorized use of computer programs, files, or systems, 51 A.L.R.4th 971.

Theft by deception.

(1) A person commits theft ifhe obtains or exercises control over property of
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as
to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely
to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means an
exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to
the public or to a class or group.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-405, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-405.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Attempted theft.
Distribution of imitation controlled substance.

Elements of offense.
-Reliance.
--Series
of misrepresentations.
-Pecuniary loss.
Evidence.
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825 P.2d 681 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied, 843
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992) (following State v.
Schneider, 715 P.2d 297 (Ariz. App. 1986)).

Forgery distinguished.
Intent.
Jury instructions.
"Purpose to deprive."
Venue of offense.
Cited.

Constitutionality.
This section is not unconstitutionally vague
or ambiguous; fact that auto salesman who
knew that turning back an odometer was a
crime assertedly relied upon the fact that former§ 41-6-177 made such crime only a misdemeanor did not preclude conviction of the salesman of theft by deception on basis of his having
turned back the odometer. State v. Forshee, 588
P.2d 181 (Utah 1978).
Attempted theft.
Because § 76-4-101 provides for attempted
theft by deception, there is no reason to enlarge
the scope of this section to include situations in
which theft by deception might have happened,
but, because of the victim's lack of reliance on
the perpetrator's deception, did not occur. State
v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).
Distribution of imitation controlled substance.
Defendant who distributed an imitation controlled substance in violation of § 58-37b-4
should have been charged with a violation of
§ 58-37b-4,which specifically proscribed defendant's conduct, rather than with theft by deception. State v. Hill, 688 P.2d 450 (Utah 1984).
Elements of offense.
For cases discussing elements of former offense of obtaining money by false pretense, see
State v. Howd, 55 Utah 527, 188 P. 628 (1920);
State v. Casperson, 71 Utah 68, 262 P. 294
(1927); State v. Jensen, 74 Utah 527, 280 P.
1046 (1929); State v. Morris, 85 Utah 210, 38
P.2d1097 (1934); State v. Timmerman, 88 Utah
481, 55 P.2d 1320 (1936); Ballaine v. District
Court ex rel. Box Elder County, 107 Utah 247,
153P.2d 265 (1944); State v. Vatsis, 10 Utah 2d
244, 351 P.2d 96 (1960); State v. Nuttall, 16
Utah 2d 171, 397 P.2d 797 (1964).
-Reliance.
Reliance by the victim is an element of the
crime of theft by deception; even though the
allegedvictim is deceived, ifhe does not rely on
the deception in parting with his property,
there has been no theft by deception. State v.
Jones, 657 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1982).
A finding of reliance is sufficient so Jong as
the defendant's misrepresentation has a substantial causal influence upon the victim's decision,i.e., the victim believes the misrepresentation to be true, and includes it as a factor in
the decision-making process. State v. LeFevre,

--Series
of misrepresentations.
In situations where the deception consists of
a series of misrepresentations, there is no requirement that each false statement or act
conform to the level-of-reliance test set out in
State v. Schneider, 715 P.2d 297 (Ariz. App.
1986); the victim need only have materially
relied on the resulting deception. State v.
LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).
-Pecuniary
loss.
Evidence of pecuniary loss can be used to
prove the elements of the crime of theft by
deception, although pecuniary loss is not an
essential element in itself. State v. Roberts, 711
P.2d 235 (Utah 1985).
Evidence.
Evidence that defendant had signed name of
alleged buyer of automobile to conditional sales
contract which was purchased by finance company, and that automobile was subsequently
sold to third person who paid cash sustained
conviction for obtaining money by false pretenses. State v. Vatsis, 10 Utah 2d 244, 351 P.2d
96 (1960).
Evidence was not sufficient to support beyond a reasonable doubt finding that buyer was
reasonably certain that his promise to make a
deposit into his checking account would not be
performed, and was therefore insufficient to
support his conviction for theft by deception
when his personal check for payment of the
goods was returned for insufficient funds,
where at time buyer gave seller the check he
informed seller of the insufficient funds in the
account; he requested seller not to cash the
check that day; he informed seller that he had
assurances from investors of imminent cash
investments which he would deposit to cover
the check; the seller accepted the check on such
terms; and the check was returned for insufficient funds because the buyer did not receive
the expected cash to make the deposit. State v.
Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983).
Evidence held to be sufficient to establish the
amount of funds embezzled by a theater manager. See State v. Patterson, 700 P.2d 1104
(Utah 1985).
In a prosecution for theft by deception, there
was sufficient evidence that the defendant, who
sold a mobile home under a lease-back arrangement, then secured two loans using the same
mobile home as collateral, without disclosing
that title was encumbered, intended to deceive
at the time of the transactions. State v. Noren,
704 P.2d 568 (Utah 1985).
The defendant's convictions of securities
fraud and theft by deception were reversed
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because the trial court committed prejudicial
error by admitting defendant's financial
records in violation of the Financial Information Privacy Act. State v. Waite, 803 P.2d 1279
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Forgery distinguished.
Court properly ordered release of defendant
who had pleaded guilty to crime of obtaining
money or property by false pretenses, when
information charged him with crime of forgery;
former crime was not "necessarily included" in
crime of forgery, although both crimes included
elements of fraud; forgery had to do with alteration or falsification of written instruments or
documents, or use of unauthorized signatures,
while false pretenses statute applied to wide
range of activities related to property which
might have in some instances involved forgery,
but usually did not. Williams v. Turner, 421
F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1970).
Intent.
In a prosecution for theft by deception, the
intent of the defendant at the time of taking the
victim's money is determinative, and the fact
that the defendant later enters an agreement
with the victim, appearing to negate any criminal intent, is immaterial. State v. Droddy, 702
P.2d 111 (Utah 1985).
Jury instructions.
Instructions referred to the intent required
for commission of the offense but that did not
inform the jury that before returning a verdict
of guilty they must find beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant had the conscious objective to withhold the property permanently was

fatally defective. State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33
(Utah 1980).
Where defendant was charged with theft by
deception, instruction to jury stating that they
"may" employ a presumption that "the law
presumes that a person intends the reasonable
and ordinary consequences of his own act" violated defendant's constitutional right to due
process of law because under the instruction
given, the burden of persuasion on the element
of intent, in the jury's mind, may have been
shifted to the defendant. State v. Walton, 646
P.2d 689 (Utah 1982).

"Purpose to deprive."
The defendant's "purpose to deprive" was
inferred from the following facts: in 1984, the
defendant began borrowing small amounts of
money from the victim to buy pet food; the
victim's generosity prompted defendant to
make subsequent requests for larger sums to
pay for everything from automobile repairs to
medical bills; with each request, defendant inevitably promised to repay the victim soon or by
a specific date; and between 1984 and 1986,
defendant borrowed over $70,000 and repaid
only about $1,500. State v. Fowler, 745 P.2d 472
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Venue of offense.
District court had jurisdiction of offense of
obtaining money by false pretense where both
mispresentation and delivery of goods were
accomplished in Utah. State v. Cobb, 13 Utah
2d 376, 374 P.2d 844 (1962).
Cited in State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959 (Ct. App.
1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Criminal and Civil
Liability for Bad Checks in Utah, 1970 Utah L.
Rev. 122.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 32 Am. Jur. 2d False Pretenses§ 1.
C.J.S. - 35 C.J.S. False Pretenses § 5.
A.L.R. - Attempts to commit offenses of
larceny by trick, confidence game, false pre-
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tenses, and the like, 6 A.L.R.3d 241.
Criminal liability of corporation for extortion;
false pretenses, or similar offenses, 49 A.L.R.3d
820.
Criminal liability in connection with application for, or receipt of, public relief or welfare
payments, 80 A.L.R.3d 1280.
Key Numbers. - False Pretenses e=> 2.

Theft by extortion.

(1) A person is guilty of theft if he obtains or exercises control over the
property of another by extortion and with the purpose to deprive him thereof.
(2) As used in this section, extortion occurs when a person threatens to:
(a) Cause physical harm in the future to the person threatened or to any
other person or to property at any time; or
(b) Subject the person threatened or any other person to physical
confinement or restraint; or
(c) Engage in other conduct constituting a crime; or
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(d) Accuse any person of a crime or expose him to hatred, contempt, or
ridicule; or
(e) Reveal any information sought to be concealed by the person
threatened; or
(f) Testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information
with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or
(g) Take action as an official against anyone or anything, or withhold
official action, or cause such action or withholding; or
(h) Bring about or continue a strike, boycott, or other similar collective
action to obtain property which is not demanded or received for the benefit
of the group which the actor purports to represent; or
(i) Do any other act which would not in itself substantially benefit him
but which would harm substantially any other person with respect to that
person's health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation, or personal relationships.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-406, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-406.

Cross-References. - Penalty for receiving
illegal fees,§§ 21-7-13 to 21-7-15.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Fear.
If fear was controlling factor in inducing
victim to consent to and to pay money to defendant, crime of extortion was complete, even
though there was also another different motive,

that of entrapping defendant at suggestion of
prosecuting attorney; if fear remained as controlling factor, it was unnecessary for it to be
sole motive. State v. Prince, 75 Utah 205,284 P.
108 (1930).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 31AAm. Jur. 2d Extortion,
Blackmail and Threats § 1.
C.J.S. - 35 C.J.S. Extortion § 1.
A.L.R. - Criminal liability of corporation for

extortion, false pretenses, or similar offenses,
49 A.L.R.3d 820.
Key Numbers. - Extortion and Threats <i:=>
1.

76-6-407. Theft of lost, mislaid, or mistakenly
property.

delivered

A person commits theft when:
(1) He obtains property of another which he knows to have been lost or
mislaid, or to have been delivered under a mistake as to the identity of the
recipient or as to the nature or amount of the property, without taking
reasonable measures to return it to the owner; and
(2) He has the purpose to deprive the owner of the property when he
obtains the property or at any time prior to taking the measures designated in paragraph (1).
History: C. 1953, 76-6-407, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-407.
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Am. Jur. 2d. § 101.
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50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny

Receiving
kers.

C.J.S. - 52A C.J.S. Larceny§ 18.
Key Numbers. - Larceny
10.

stolen property-Duties

of pawnbro-

(1) A person commits theft ifhe receives, retains, or disposes of the property
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen,
intending to deprive the owner of it.
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the
case of an actor who:
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a
separate occasion;
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the
receiving offense charged;
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed,
acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable
value; or
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker or
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or
representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains
property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to:
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the
property;
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the
bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identification.
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in
or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every
agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to
comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be presumed to have
bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or
unlawfully obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof.
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence
that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal
property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or
person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed, or withheld the
property without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2)(d), then
the burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property bought,
received, or obtained was not stolen.
(5) Subsections (2)(d), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as
defined in Section 76-10-901.
(6) As used in this section:
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on
the security of the property;
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(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-408, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-408; 1979, ch. 71, § 1;
1993, ch. 102, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, substituted "Subsection" for "paragraph" in Subsection (2), subdivided Subsection (2)(d), moved "if the value
given for the property exceeds $20" which was
formerly in Subsection (2)(d)(i) to the introduc-

tory language, inserted "picture" in Subsection
(2)(d)(iii), redesignated former Subsections
(2)(d)(i) and (ii) as Subsections (3) and (4),
inserted Subsection (5), making a corresponding designation change, and made stylistic
changes.
Cross-References. - Pawnbrokers and secondhand dealers, § 11-6-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
stolen; (2) the defendant aided in concealing
this property; (3) at the time he so aided in
concealing it he knew the item had been stolen;
and (4) his purpose in acting was to deprive the
owner thereof of possession. State v. Lamm, 606
P.2d 229 (Utah 1980).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Applicability.
Elements.
-Concealing stolen property.
-Receiving stolen property.
Entrapment.
Evidence.
Intent.
Prima facie case.
Separate offenses.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
The presumption created in Subsection (2) is
constitutional when read in light of§ 76-1-503,
which provides that a presumption means only
that the issue of the presumed fact must be
submitted to the jury unless its existence is
clearly negated and that the jury may treat
proofof the underlying facts as evidence of the
presumed fact, but does not disturb the requirement that the presumed fact, like all other
elements of the crime, must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Mullins, 549 P.2d 454
(Utah 1976).
The phrase "believing that it probably has
been stolen" in Subsection (1), while not a
model of draftsmanship, is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Plum, 552 P.2d 124 (Utah
1976).
Applicability.
The plain meaning of Subsection (2)(d) limits
its application to pawnbrokers and similar
businesses that generally deal in small purchases of secondhand consumer goods. It does
not include businesses that regularly deal in
large bulk orders of raw industrial material.
Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah
1993).
Elements.
-Concealing stolen property.
The elements in the crime of concealing or
aiding in the concealment of stolen property
are: (1) property belonging to another has been

-Receiving
stolen property.
Elements of the crime of receiving stolen
property are: property belonging to another has
been stolen; the defendant received, retained or
disposed of the stolen property; at the time of
receiving, retaining or disposing of the property
the defendant knew or believed the property
was stolen; and the defendant acted purposely
to deprive the owner of the possession of the
property. State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399 (Utah
1980).
Time of the alleged offense is not an essential
element of the crime of receiving stolen property; state's proof that offense occurred on a
date different than that alleged in the information was not fatal to defendant's conviction for
receiving stolen property where the applicable
limitations statute had not run at the time the
charge was filed. State v. Wilson, 642 P.2d 394
(Utah 1982).
In order to obtain a conviction for theft by
receiving, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
(1) The defendant received, retained, or disposed of the property of another, (2) knowing
that the property had been stolen or believing
that it probably had been stolen, (3) with the
purpose to deprive the owner thereof. State v.
Hill, 727 P.2d 221 (Utah 1986).
Entrapment.
Trial court properly found entrapment in a
"sting" operation involving use of an attractive
female undercover police officer to sell stolen
merchandise to a jewelry store owner who may
have been encouraged to suggest that his relationship with the officer become more intimate.
State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987).
Evidence.
Evidence establishing receiving stolen prop-
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erty under this section is sufficient to sustain a
conviction for theft under § 76-6-404 without
the necessity of establishing theft by taking.
State v. Taylor, 570 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977).
Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant
of concealing stolen property where employees
of construction company saw stolen welder in a
pickup truck belonging to defendant, defendant's son recklessly sped away from restaurant parking lot while employees called the
sheriff, and defendant asked the man he purchased the pickup truck from not to tell who he
had sold the truck to. State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d
229 (Utah 1980).
Where burglar discovered machine gun parts
that had already been stolen and placed in a
rental storage unit, it was permissible to obtain
a search warrant to obtain the remaining stolen parts in order to prosecute defendant for
theft by receiving. State v. Williamson, 674 P.2d
132 (Utah 1983).
Evidence that defendant paid for stolen property with a contraband drug was relevant to
show the general circumstances surrounding
defendant's purchase, receipt and retention of
the stolen property. State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d
780 (Utah 1986).
There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction, where he and a codefendant were seen together by store personnel
under conditions that suggested a common
shoplifting enterprise, where store personnel
saw defendant accompanying the codefendant
when the latter returned stolen property for
cash, and where defendant had a padlock and a
substantial sum of money in his possession
when apprehended for which no reasonable
explanation was given. State v. Gabaldon, 735
P.2d 410 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Evidence was sufficient that reasonable
minds could find that defendant believed television sets and videocassette recorders were
stolen, where, upon receiving the goods from an
undercover police officer, defendant remarked,
"I wish you wouldn't cut the serial numbers off.
That makes it look hot." State v. Belt, 780 P.2d
1271 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Intent.
Conviction for attempted theft by receiving

two horses was upheld where defendant believed horses were stolen, even though horses
were not stolen but were being used in sting
operation. State v. Powell, 672 P.2d 96 (Utah
1983).
A defendant can be convicted of receiving
stolen property if he actually believes the property is stolen and takes all the steps within his
power to complete the intended theft, even if
the property is not in fact stolen. State v.
Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1985).
Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction
for receiving merchandise in the course of a
police sting operation, because the jury could
reasonably have concluded that the defendant,
at the time of the transactions, believed that
the property was stolen, despite his self-serving
assertion at trial that he had believed otherwise. State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).

Prima facie case.
Prosecution failed to establish a prima facie
case for the crime of receiving stolen property
where it did not introduce any evidence, either
circumstantial or direct, to establish and prove
an unlawful purpose at the time of the defendant's possession of the property. State v.
Murphy, 617 P.2d 399 (Utah 1980).
Separate offenses.
Concealing stolen property is an offense distinct from and independent of receiving stolen
property. State v. Ramon, 736 P.2d 1059 (Utah
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah
1987).
Trial court committed reversible error in allowing the state to amend an information
charging defendants with theft by receiving,
where the amendment charged concealing stolen property, an additional or different offense.
State v. Ramon, 736 P.2d 1059 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).
Cited in State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207
(utah 1985); State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah
1985); State v. Fowler, 745 P.2d 472 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Recent Developments
in Utah Law,-- Judicial Decisions - Constitutional Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 82.
Am. Jur. 2d. -66Am. Jur. 2d Receiving and
Transporting Stolen Property § 1.
C.J.S. - 76 C.J.S. Receiving Stolen Goods
§ 2 et seq.

A.L.R. - Conviction of receiving stolen property, or related offenses, where stolen property
previously placed under police control, 72
A.L.R.4th 838.
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76-6-409. Theft of services.
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains services which he knows are
available only for compensation by deception, threat, force, or any other means
designed to avoid the due payment for them.
(2) ,A person commits theft if, having control over the disposition of services
of another, to which he knows he is not entitled, he diverts the services to his
own benefit or to the benefit of another who he knows is not entitled to them.
(3) In this section "services" includes, but is not limited to, labor, professional service, public utility and transportation services, restaurant, hotel,
motel, tourist cabin, rooming house, and like accommodations, the supplying of
equipment, tools, vehicles, or trailers for temporary use, telephone or telegraph service, steam, admission to entertainment, exhibitions, sporting
events, or other events for which a charge is made.
(4) Under this section "services" includes gas, electricity, water, sewer, or
cable television services, only if the services are obtained by threat, force, or a
form of deception not described in Section 76-6-409.3.
(5) Under this section "services" includes telephone services only if the
services are obtained by threat, force, or a form of deception not described in
Sections 76-6-409.5 through 76-6-409.9.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-409, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-4-409; 1987, ch. 38, § 1;
1989, ch. 30, § 1; 1994, ch. 215, § 1.

Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, added Subsection

(5).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
vices. State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650 (Utah
1985).

ANALYSIS

Intent to pay for services.
Proof.
Cited.
Intent to pay for services.
A person who accepts the benefit of services
for which he plans in good faith to pay later
cannot be convicted of theft, even though he
subsequently does not pay the provider of ser-

Proof.
Proof of a mere failure to pay for services is
insufficient to sustain a finding of fraudulent
intent. State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650 (Utah
1985).
Cited in State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400
(Utah 1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny § 77.
A.L.R. - State civil actions by subscription
televisionbusiness for use, or providing technical means of use, of transmissions by nonsubscribers, 46 A.L.R.4th 811.
Offense of obtaining telephone services by

unauthorized use of another's telephone number - state cases, 61 A.L.R.4th 1197.
Validity and construction of statute or ordinance specifically criminalizing passenger misconduct on public transportation, 78 A.L.R.4th
1127.

76-6-409.1. Devices for theft of services - Seizure
destruction - Civil actions for damages.

and

(1) A person may not knowingly:
(a) make or possess any instrument, apparatus, equipment, or device
for the use of, or for the purpose of, committing or attempting to commit
theft under Section 76-6-409 or 76-6-409.3; or
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(b) sell, offer to sell, advertise, give, transport, or otherwise transfer to
another any information, instrument, apparatus, equipment, or device, or
any information, plan, or instruction for obtaining, making, or assembling
the same, with intent that it be used, or caused to be used, to commit or
attempt to commit theft under Section 76-6-409 or 76-6-409.3.
(2) (a) Any information, instrument, apparatus, equipment, or device, or
information, plan, or instruction referred to in Subsection (1) may be
seized pursuant to a court order, lawful search and seizure, lawful arrest,
or other lawful process.
(b) Upon the conviction of any person for a violation of any provision of
this section, any information, instrument, apparatus, equipment, device,
plan, or instruction shall be destroyed as contraband by the sheriff of the
county in which the person was convicted.
(3) A person who violates any provision of Subsection (1) or (2) is guilty of a
class A misdemeanor.
(4) Criminal prosecutions under this section do not affect any person's right
of civil action for redress for damages suffered as a result of any violation of
this section.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-601, enacted by L.
1979,ch.77,§
1;1987,ch.38,§
2.

76-6-409.3.

Theft of utility or cable television

services.

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Cable television service" means any audio, video, or data service
provided by a cable television company over its cable system facilities for
payment, but does not include the use of a satellite dish or antenna.
(b) "Owner" includes any part-owner, joint owner, tenant in common,
joint tenant, or tenant by the entirety of the whole or a part of any building
and the property on which it is located.
(c) "Person" means any individual, firm, partnership, corporation, company, association, or other legal entity.
(d) "Tenant or occupant" includes any person, including the owner, who
occupies the whole or part of any building, whether alone or with others.
(e) "Utility" means any public utility, municipally-owned utility, or
cooperative utility which provides electricity, gas, water, or sewer, or any
combination of them, for sale to consumers.
(2) A person is guilty of theft of a utility or cable television service if he
commits any of the following acts which make gas, electricity, water, sewer, or
cable television available to a tenant or occupant, including himself, with
intent to avoid due payment to the utility or cable television company. Any
person aiding and abetting in these prohibited acts is a party to the offense
under Section 76-2-202. Prohibited acts include:
(a) connecting any tube, pipe, wire, cable, or other instrument with any
meter, device, or other instrument used for conducting gas, electricity,
water, sewer, or cable television in a manner as permits the use of the gas,
electricity, water, sewer, or cable television without its passing through a
meter or other instrument recording the usage for billing;
(b) altering, injuring, or preventing the normal action of a meter, valve,
stopcock, or other instrument used for measuring quantities of gas,
electricity, water, or sewer service, or making or maintaining any modifi208
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cation or alteration to any device installed with the authorization of a
cable television company for the purpose of intercepting or receiving any
program or other service carried by the company which the person is not
authorized by the company to receive;
(c) reconnecting gas, electricity, water, sewer, or cable television connections or otherwise restoring service when one or more of those utilities
or cable service have been lawfully disconnected or turned off by the
provider of the utility or cable service;
(d) intentionally breaking, defacing, or causing to be broken or defaced
any seal, locking device, or other part of a metering device for recording
usage of gas, electricity, water, or sewer service, or a security system for
the recording device, or a cable television control device;
(e) removing a metering device designed to measure quantities of gas,
electricity, water, or sewer service;
(f) transferring from one location to another a metering device for
measuring quantities of public utility services of gas, electricity, water, or
sewer service;
(g) changing the indicated consumption, jamming the measuring device, bypassing the meter or measuring device with a jumper so that it
does not indicate use or registers use incorrectly, or otherwise obtaining
quantities of gas, electricity, water, or sewer service from the utility
without their passing through a metering device for measuring quantities
of consumption for billing purposes;
(h) using a metering device belonging to the utility that has not been
assigned to the location and installed by the utility;
(i) fabricating or using a device to pick or otherwise tamper with the
locks used to deter utility service diversion, meter tampering, meter
thefts, and unauthorized cable television service;
(j) assisting or instructing any person in obtaining or attempting to
obtain any cable television service without payment of all lawful compensation to the company providing the service;
(k) making or maintaining a connection or connections, whether physical, electrical, mechanical, acoustical, or by other means, with any cables,
wires, components, or other devices used for the distribution of cable
television services without authority from the cable television company; or
(1) possessing without authority any device or printed circuit board
designed in whole or in part to receive any cable television programming
or services offered for sale over a cable television system with the intent
that the device or printed circuit be used for the reception of the cable
television company's services without payment. For purposes of this
subsection, device or printed circuit board does not include the use of a
satellite dish or antenna.
(3) The presence on property in the possession of a person of any device or
alteration which permits the diversion or use of utility or cable service to avoid
the registration of the use by or on a meter installed by the utility or to
otherwise avoid the recording of use of the service for payment or otherwise
avoidpayment gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the
property installed the device or caused the alteration if:
(a) the presence of the device or alteration can be attributed only to a
deliberate act in furtherance of an intent to avoid payment for utility or
cable television service; and
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(b) the person charged has received the direct benefit of the reduction of
the cost of the utility or cable television service.
(4) A person who violates this section is guilty of the offense of theft ofutility
or cable television service.
(a) In the case of theft of utility services, if the value of the gas,
electricity, water, or sewer service is:
(i) up to $250, the offense is a class A misdemeanor;
(ii) greater than $250 but not more than $1,000, the offense is a
third degree felony;
(iii) greater than $1,000, or if the offender has previously been
convicted of a violation of this section, the offense is a second degree
felony.
(b) In the case of theft of cable television services, the penalties are
prescribed in Section 76-6-412.
(5) A person who violates this section shall make restitution to the utility or
cable television company for the value of the gas, electricity, water, sewer, or
cable television service consumed in violation of this section plus all reasonable
expenses and costs incurred on account of the violation of this section.
Reasonable expenses and costs include expenses and costs for investigation,
disconnection, reconnection, service calls, employee time, and equipment use.
(6) Criminal prosecution under this section does not affect the right of a
utility or cable television company to bring a civil action for redress for
damages suffered as a result of the commission of any of the acts prohibited by
this section.
(7) This section does not abridge or alter any other right, action, or remedy •
otherwise available to a utility or cable television company.
History: C. 1953, § 76-6-409.3, enacted by
L. 1987, ch. 38, § 3; 1989, ch. 30, § 2; 1990,
ch. 130, § 1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. - State civil actions by subscription
television business for use, or providing techni-

76-6-409.5.

cal means of use, of transmissions
scribers, 46 A.L.R.4th 811.

by nonsub-

Definitions.

As used in this section and Sections 76-6-409.6 through 76-6-409.10:
(1) "Access device" means any telecommunication device including the
telephone calling card number, electronic serial number, account number,
mobile identification number, or personal identification number that can
be used to obtain telephone service.
(2) "Manufacture of an unlawful telecommunication device" means to
produce or assemble an unlawful telecommunication device, or to modify,
alter, program, or reprogram a telecommunication device to be capable of '
acquiring or facilitating the acquisition of telecommunication service
without the consent of the telecommunication service provider.
(3) "Sell" means to offer to, agree to offer to, or to sell, exchange, give,or
dispose of an unlawful telecommunications device to another.
(4) "Telecommunication device" means:
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(a) any type of instrument, device, machine, or equipment which is
capable of transmitting or receiving telephonic, electronic, or radio
communications; or
(b) any part of an instrument, device, machine, or equipment, or
other computer circuit, computer chip, electronic mechanism, or other
component, which is capable of facilitating the transmission or
reception of telephonic or electronic communications within the radio
spectrum allocated to cellular radio telephony.
(5) "Telecommunication service" includes any service provided for a
charge or compensation to facilitate the origination, transmission, emission, or reception of signs, signals, writings, images, and sounds or
intelligence of any nature by telephone, including cellular telephones,
wire, radio, television optical or other electromagnetic system.
(6) "Telecommunication service provider" means any person or entity
providing telecommunication service including a cellular telephone or
paging company or other person or entity which, for a fee, supplies the
facility, cell site, mobile telephone switching office, or other equipment or
telecommunication service.
(7) "Unlawful telecommunication device" means any telecommunication device that is capable of, or has been altered, modified, programmed,
or reprogrammed, alone or in conjunction with another access device, so as
to be capable of, acquiring or facilitating the acquisition of a telecommunication service without the consent of the telecommunication service
provider. Unlawful devices include tumbler phones, counterfeit phones,
tumbler microchips, counterfeit microchips, and other instruments capable of disguising their identity or location or of gaining access to a
communications system operated by a telecommunication service provider.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-409.5, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 215, § 2.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 215

became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

76-6-409.6. Use of telecommunication
device to avoid lawful charge for service - Penalty.
(1) Any person who uses a telecommunication device with the intent to
avoid the payment of any lawful charge for telecommunication service or with
the knowledge that it was to avoid the payment of any lawful charge for
telecommunication service is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor, if the value of the telecommunication service
cannot be ascertained;
(b) a class A misdemeanor, if the value of the telecommunication service
charge is less than $250;
(c) a third degree felony, if the value of the telecommunication service is
greater than $250 but not more than $1,000; or
(d) a second degree felony, if the value of the telecommunication service
is greater than $1,000.
(2) Any person who has been convicted previously of an offense under this
section shall be guilty of a second degree felony upon a second conviction and
any subsequent conviction.
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History: C.1953, 76-6-409.6, enacted byL.
1994, ch. 215, § 3.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 215

76-6-409.7.

became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Possession of any unlawful
tion device - Penalty.

telecommunica-

(1) Any person who knowingly possesses an unlawful telecommunication
device shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(2) If any person knowingly possesses five or more unlawful telecommunication devices in the same criminal episode, he shall be guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
History: C.1953, 76-6-409.7, enacted byL.
1994, ch. 215, § 4.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 215

76-6-409.8.

became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Sale of an unlawful telecommunication
-Penalty.

device

( 1) Any person shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor who intentionally
sells an unlawful telecommunication device or material, including hardware,
data, computer software, or other information or equipment, knowing that the
purchaser or a third person intends to use such material in the manufacture of
an unlawful telecommunication device.
(2) If the offense under this section involves the intentional sale of five or
more unlawful telecommunication devices within a six-month period, the
person committing the offense shall be guilty of a third degree felony.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-409.8, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 215, § 5.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 215

76-6-409.9.

became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Manufacture of an unlawful
tion device - Penalty.

telecommunica-

(1) Any person who intentionally manufactures an unlawful telecommunication device shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(2) If the offense under this section involves the intentional manufacture of
five or more unlawful telecommunication devices within a six-month period,
the person committing the offense shall be guilty of a third degree felony.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-409.9, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 215, § 6.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 215

became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

76-6-409.10. Payment of restitution
Other remedies retained.

-

Civil action -

(1) A person who violates Sections 76-10-409.5 through 76-10-409.9 shall
make restitution to the telecommunication service provider for the value of the
telecommunication service consumed in violation of this section plus all
reasonable expenses and costs incurred on account of the violation of this
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section. Reasonable expenses and costs include expenses and costs for investigation, service calls, employee time, and equipment use.
(2) Criminal prosecution under this section does not affect the right of a
telecommunication service provider to bring a civil action for redress for
damages suffered as a result of the commission of any of the acts prohibited by
this section.
(3) This section does not abridge or alter any other right, action, or remedy
otherwise available to a telecommunication service provider.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-409.10, enacted by
L. 1994, ch. 215, § 7.
Compiler's Notes. - The reference in Subsection (1) should probably be to§§ 76-6-409.5
through 76-6-409.9, as those sections prohibit

theft of telecommunication services and the
cited sections do not exist.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 215
became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

76-6-410. Theft by person having custody of property
pursuant to repair or rental agreement.
A person is guilty of theft if:
(1) Having custody of property pursuant to an agreement between
himself or another and the owner thereof whereby the actor or another is
to perform for compensation a specific service for the owner involving the
maintenance, repair, or use of such property, he intentionally uses or
operates it, without the consent of the owner, for his own purposes in a
manner constituting a gross deviation from the agreed purpose; or
(2) Having custody of any property pursuant to a rental or lease
agreement where it is to be returned in a specified manner or at a specified
time, intentionally fails to comply with the terms of the agreement
concerning return so as to render such failure a gross deviation from the
agreement.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-410, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-410.
Compiler's Notes. -As enacted, this section began with the designation "(1)" but did

not contain a subsection (2). The compiler has
deleted the "(1)" and redesignated former (a)
and (b) as (1) and (2).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
purpose of the entrustment, does not violate
the statute ifhe uses the property in a manner
that goes beyond the terms of the consent.
State v. Dirker, 610 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1980).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Consent to personal use.
Elements of offense.
-Reliance on deception.
Failure to return rented property.
"Gross deviation."
Use related to purpose of agreement.
Cited.

Elements of offense.

Constitutionality.
Use of the term "gross deviation" does not
make this section unconstitutionally vague.
State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1981).

-Reliance on deception.
Neither§ 76-6-405 nor this section explicitly
requires that the state show the victim relied
upon the defendant's deception, but courts have
generally treated reliance as an implicit element of the offense of theft by deception. State
v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681 (Utah Ct. App. 1992),
cert. denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).

Consent to personal use.
A person who has consent to use property for
his own personal purposes, unrelated to the

Failure to return rented property.
Where rented typewriter was not returned by
defendant after rental period despite repeated
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demands by owper, court, sitting without a jury, viation" has the common sense meaning of
being an extreme deviation. State v. Owens,
was not required to believe defendant's testi638 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1981).
mony that he gave typewriter to his business
partners to return, since partners were not
Use related to purpose of agreement.
called to corroborate his story, and defendant
Subsection (1) assumes that the property
conveniently forgot important details. State v.
Knepper, 18 Utah 2d 215, 418 P.2d 780 (1966). may be used by the custodian for purposes
Evidence supported conviction of embezzle- properly related to the purpose of the entrustment; only a use that constitutes "a gross
ment, where defendant had been given permission to continue to use car on somewhat open- deviation from the agreed purpose," without
express consent for personal use, is a crime.
ended contract after initial rerital period had
expired, but defendant failed to return car on State v. Dirker, 610 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1980).
specific date on which he was finally told that
Cited in State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah
he must return it. State v. Reemer, 26 Utah 2d
Ct. App. 1988).
309, 489 P.2d 107 (1971).

"Gross deviation."
As used in this section, the term "gross deCOLLATERAL REFERENCES

Key Numbers. - Larceny

Am. Jur. 2d. - 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny§ 89.
C.J.S. - 52A C.J.S. Larceny §§ 46,47.

76-6-411.

Repealed.

Repeals. - Section 76-6-411, as enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-411, relating to theft by
failure to make required payment or disposi-

76-6-412.

<S:o 15.

tion of property subject to legal obligation, was
repealed by Laws 1974, ch. 32, § 41.

Theft - Classification of offenses - Action for
treble damages against receiver of stolen property.

( 1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be
punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000;
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; or
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another;
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is more than $250 but not more
than $1,000;
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer,
steer, ox, bull, c3:lf,sheep, go~t, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry;
(c) as a class A misdemeanor 1f the value of the property stolen was
more than $100 but does not exceed $250; or
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was
$100 or less.
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of Subsection 76-6-408(1)
may bring an action against any person mentioned in Subsection 76-640~(2)~d)for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the
plamtiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees.
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History: C. 1953, 76-6-412, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-412; 1974, ch. 32, § 18;
1975, ch. 48, § 1; 1977, ch. 89, § 1; 1989, ch.
78, § 1.

76-6-412

Cross-References. - Bus Passenger Safety
Act, theft of baggage or cargo, § 76-10-1508.
Civil liability for treble damages for theft of
livestock, § 4-24-27.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Evidence.
State's use of color photographs of the stolen
property for evidence rather than producing
the actual tangible stolen property did not deny
defendant due process of law. State v.
Ballenberger, 652 P.2d 927 (Utah 1982).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Construction.
Determining degree of crime.
Evidence.
Instructions.
Lesser included offenses.
Livestock.
Prior convictions.
Single offense based on separate takings.
Valuation of stolen property.
-Testimony of owner.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
This section, by making theft of certain livestock a third degree felony, irrespective of the
value of the livestock, does not deny equal
protection of the laws and does not violate the
constitutional prohibition against private or
special laws. State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841 (Utah
1981).
Construction.
This section does not outline the elements of
the crime of theft; it simply categorizes theft for
sentencing purposes into various degrees of
felonies and misdemeanors. Thus defendant
was improperly charged under § 76-6-404 and
this section with two separate counts of second
degree theft for stealing both a firearm and
property worth over $1000 in a single burglary;
the crime was instead one theft offense under
§ 76-6-404 punishable as a second degree felony under this section. State v. Casias, 772 P.2d
975 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
No claim for treble damages based on § 766-408(2)(d)and this section against businesses
that regularly deal in large bulk orders of raw
industrial material. See Alta Indus. Ltd. v.
Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1993).
Determining degree of crime.
In theft by deception, degree of the crime is
determined by the value of the property obtained by defendant as a result of the deception
without reducing that amount by any value
received by the victim. State v. Forshee, 588
P.2d 181 (Utah 1978).
Defendant's second degree felony conviction,
based on a check written for exactly $1,000,
was plain error, since he could only have been
convictedof a third degree felony on the basis of
the $1,000 check. State v. Burnett, 712 P.2d 260
(Utah 1985).

Instructions.
It was reversible error to omit to instruct as
to amount of debt owing by defendant on auto,
left for repairs, but taken and driven away
without satisfying lien existing on car; if jury
had found that debt was less than $50, conviction for grand larceny would have been error.
State v. Parker, 104 Utah 23, 137 P.2d 626
(1943).
Lesser included offenses.
The crime of carrying a concealed dangerous
weapon is a lesser included offense of seconddegree felony retail theft when the retail theft
is made a felony by the actor's being armed
with a deadly weapon in the course of the
crime. State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
Livestock.
Theft of dead calf was grand larceny, even
though value of meat did not exceed $50, where
animal was killed by thief as means of making
theft possible. State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402, 131
P.2d 805 (1942).
Prior convictions.
A judgment of prior conviction must be written, clear and definite, and signed by the court
(or the clerk in a jury case) in order to serve as
the basis for enhancing a penalty under this
section. State v. Anderson, 797 P.2d 1114 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).
Single offense based on separate takings.
Where defendant was employed to solicit
advertising contracts and within short time
had collected from different persons $235 due
publishing company upon contracts solicited
and procured by him, and where he had unlawfully converted money to his own use, taking of
$235 was one embezzlement and constituted
grand larceny, even though $48 was largest
amount collected from any one individual.
State v. Gibson, 37 Utah 330, 108 P. 349 (1910).
The value of the property stolen in separate
transactions can be added together to determine the degree of the crime if the separate
transactions are part of one continuing plan
and thus constitute a single offense. State v.
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Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515 (Utah 1980).
Valuation of stolen property.
Where auto owner took his car from possession of repairman by trick, or otherwise stole
special property of bailee, value was amount of
indebtedness; where thing stolen was written
instrument evidencing debt, its value was determined by amount remaining unpaid
thereon. State v. Parker, 104 Utah 23, 137 P.2d
626 (1943).
Stealing of purse which was 1 l/2 feet from
owner was not grand larceny in absence of proof
of value. State v. Lucero, 28 Utah 2d 61, 498
P.2d 350 (1972).
For purposes of determining the degree of an
offense graded in terms of the value of the
property stolen, the proper measure is the
current market value of the property at the
time and place where the alleged offense was
committed. State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah
1977).
Evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that more than $250 had been
stolen from washers and dryers in a coinoperated laundromat where laundromat owner,
who had operated the business for twelve
years, testified that roughly $600 to $800 was
missing based upon estimates from money in
the machines that were not disturbed and the
total amount of money found in defendant's
possession was nearly $600. State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980).
The prima facie value of a stolen check is its
face value whether the check is endorsed or not.
State v. Pacheco, 636 P.2d 489 (Utah 1981).
Evidence held sufficient to establish at least

$250 embezzled by theater manager. State v.
Patterson, 700 P.2d 1104 (Utah 1985).
To prove market value in a different city, the
cities must be sufficiently close geographically
and similar in population to be considered
comparable for purposes of valuing the property. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985).
-Testimony of owner.
Owner is competent to testify to the value of
stolen property where the owner's opinion of
the value is based on comparable prices for
similar property. State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142
(Utah 1978).
Owner of the stolen property was allowed to
give his opinion as to the value of such property.
State v. Ballenberger, 652 P.2d 927 (Utah 1982).
Because an owner is presumed to be familiar
with the value of his possessions, an owner is
competent to testify on the present market
value of his property. State v. Purcell, 711 P.2d
243 (Utah 1985).
Owner's testimony that a stolen ring was
worth $200 was inadmissible, because he had
no independent knowledge or memory of its
value nor was his memory refreshed after looking at a police report. State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d
474 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 843 P.2d
516 (Utah 1992).
Cited in State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah
1985); State v. Parkin, 742 P.2d 715 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987); State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616
(Utah 1987); State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1987); State v. Barber, 747 P.2d 436
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Hunter, 831 P.2d
1033 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny§ 44.
C.J.S. - 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 60(1).

Key Numbers. - Larceny e=> 23.

PART5
FRAUD
76-6-501.

Forgery - ''Writing" defined.

(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any
such altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion,
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a
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numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing or any other method of
recording information, checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or
identification.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing is or purports to be:
(a) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued
by a government, or any agency thereof; or
(b) a check with a face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stocks,
bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in or
claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any
person or enterprise.
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be
a check with a face amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a class A
misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-501, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-501; 1974, ch. 32, § 19;
1975, ch. 52, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
for it was immaterial that attempt to utter was
unsuccessful; it was fact of uttering or attempting to utter that was of evidentiary value. State
v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750 (1936).
The crime of attempted forgery involves the
same culpability and dishonesty as does the
crime of forgery itself. State v. Ross, 782 P.2d
529 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

ANALYSIS

Attempt.
Attorney signing client's name.
Authority to use forged signature.
Classification of document.
Defenses.
-Insanity.
- Postdated check.
Elements of offense.
-Making and passing.
-Passing.
-Signature.
Evidence.
-Handwriting.
-Other crimes.
-Sufficient.
False pretenses distinguished.
Fictitious name.
Indictment or information.
Intent.
"Make"or "utter."
Prescription.
Signature.
-In general.
-Authority to sign another's name.
Standard of proof.
Uttering.
Variance.
Verdict.
Cited.

Attorney signing client's name.
Section 78-51-32, which authorizes an attorney to execute documents in the name of a
client, does not authorize an attorney to forge a
client's name to a negotiable instrument such
as a settlement check and does not preclude the
attorney's conviction for forgery as a matter of
law when he does so; however, when an attorney acts pursuant to the general authority
granted by § 78-51-32 he may not later be
convicted of forgery. State v. Musselman, 667
P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983).

Attempt.
Where information charging offense of forgery contained one count for forgery and another
for uttering, attempt to utter could be shown,

Authority to use forged signature.
Where defendant forged his accomplice's
name on checks which accomplice owned but
had reported stolen, then cashed the checks
and split the proceeds with the accomplice,
defendant committed forgery as defined under
Subsection (l)(b), notwithstanding that the accomplice authorized defendant to sign his
name. State v. Collins, 597 P.2d 1317 (Utah
1979).
Classification of document.
The trial court erred in concluding that a
"receipt," a document representing that a cus-
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tomer had returned merchandise for a cash
refund, fell within the ambit of Subsection
(3)(b). Rather, such a document is properly
included under Subsection (4). State v.
Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 492 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).

Defenses.
-Insanity.
Insanity, if sufficiently established, would
constitute defense to a charge of forgery. State
v. Brown, 36 Utah 46, 102 P. 641, 24 L.R.A.
(n.s.) 545 (1909).
-Postdated check.
In prosecution for forgery, fact that forged
check was postdated did not help defendant,
who had attempted to pass it. State v. Green, 89
Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750 (1936).
Elements of offense.
-Making and passing.
Crime of forgery could consist of making of
forged instrument or of passing of instrument
known to be false, or of both making and
passing such instrument. State v. Gorham, 93
Utah 274, 72 P.2d 656 (1937); State v. Jensen,
103 Utah 478, 136 P.2d 949 (1943).
-Passing.
Even though proof failed to show that defendant had personally forged instrument, showing that defendant passed instrument knowing
it to be false or forged would prove crime of
forgery. State v. Gorham, 93 Utah 274, 72 P.2d
656 (1937); State v. Jensen, 103 Utah 478, 136
P.2d 949 (1943).
-Signature.
To convict one of uttering and passing forged
draft, it was not essential that he should have
personally affixed forged name to draft. State v.
Gorham, 93 Utah 274, 72 P.2d 656 (1937); State
v. Jensen, 103 Utah 478, 136 P.2d 949 (1943).
Evidence.
-Handwriting.
In prosecution for issuing two fictitious
checks, defendant's demand that prosecution
deliver checks to him so that he could show by
handwriting expert that he did not write or
endorse them was properly refused since defendant was charged with issuing checks rather
than with writing or endorsing them; checks
were nonetheless admitted into evidence for
purpose of showing identity of person passing
them. State v. Redmond, 19 Utah 2d 272, 430
P.2d 901 (1967).
In forgery prosecution, testimony of handwriting expert with surrounding circumstances
sufficiently corroborated testimony of accomplice to warrant submission of case to jury.
State v. Leek, 85 Utah 531, 39 P.2d 1091 (1934).

-Other crimes.
In forgery prosecution in which defendant
denied endorsing check, admission in evidence
of other checks, allegedly to prove intent, endorsements upon which accomplice testified
were made at same time endorsement involved
in prosecution was made, was prejudicial error
as tending to prove other and distinct offenses.
State v. Leek, 85 Utah 531, 39 P.2d 1091 (1934).
In prosecution for issuing fraudulent paper,
state could not prove that defendant committed
other offenses merely to show his propensity for
commission of crime; however, evidence of other
crimes was admissible ifit tended to prove that
he had necessary intention for crime charged;
evidence admissible for one purpose was not
inadmissible because it failed to meet requirements for admissibility for another purpose,
but jury should have been instructed not to use
it for the inadmissible purpose. State v.
Wellard, 3 Utah 2d 129, 279 P.2d 914 (1955).
-Sufficient.
Evidence sufficient to sustain conviction for
forgery. See State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220
(Utah 1985); State v. Ross, 782 P.2d 529 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).
Evidence showing that defendant had sold
partially completed bogus temporary driver
permits to detectives was sufficient to support
his conviction of forgery. State v. Singh, 819
P.2d 356 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
False pretenses distinguished.
Court properly ordered release of defendant
where he had pleaded guilty to crime of obtaining money or property by false pretenses, and
information charged him with crime of forgery;
former crime was not "necessarily included" in
crime of forgery; although both crimes included
elements of fraud, forgery as defined by statute
had to do with alteration or falsification of
written instruments or documents, or use of
unauthorized signatures, while false pretenses
statute applied to wide range of activities related to property, which might in some instances have involved forgery, but usually did
not. Williams v. Turner, 421 F.2d 168 (10th Cir.
1970).
Fictitious name.
Evidence that defendant signed check by
fictitious name and used it in payment for
goods and for cash supported conviction under
former statute as to issuing fraudulent paper,
as against contention that all that was proven
was violation of former§ 76-20-11, which made
issuance of check against insufficient funds a
misdemeanor. State v. Tinnin, 64 Utah 587, 232
P. 543, 43 A.L.R. 46 (1925).
It made no difference, in conviction of forgery,
whether name on questioned document was
that of real or fictitious person. State v.
Gorham, 93 Utah 274, 72 P.2d 656 (1937).
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Former statute which described offense of
issuing fraudulent paper did not require that
there had been no person in existence who bore
name appended to check, but did require that
there had been no person in existence who had
purportedly or was claimed to have made such
check. State v. Wellard, 3 Utah 2d 129, 279 P.2d
914 (1955).

Indictment or information.
Information in forgery prosecution charging
making and passing of forged check was not
duplicative and subject to motion to strike on
that ground since, where several acts were
enumerated alternatively in statute, doing of
each one being prohibited under penalty, they
could be charged conjunctively as one offense,
when not repugnant to each other, and especiallywhen each of acts charged was committed
with respect to same instrument. State v.
Jones, 81 Utah 503, 20 P.2d 614 (1933).
Intent.
County warrant did not come under former
statute which described offense of issuing
frauduient paper: if instrument was made by
purported maker, intending it at time of making to be payable to payee named therein; if
instrument was genuine, even though it later
developed that there was no such person as
payee; if at time instrument was made it was
not intended by maker to be false, unreal, and
fictitious since no subsequent endorsements
thereon could make instr1:1IDenta fictitious one;
and a fortiori, if maker did not intend instrument to be false, unreal, or fictitious since no
subsequent holder or passer could make it
such. State v. Jensen, 103 Utah 478, 136 P.2d
949 (1943).
"Make"or "utter."
Substitution of word "utter" for word "make"
in original complaint, at preliminary hearing,
did not define a crime different from that found
in the original complaint, and did not alter the
original complaint in a material or prejudicial
manner. State v. Sommers, 597 P.2d 1346 (Utah
1979).
Prescription.
Petitioner who uttered a forged prescription
to obtain controlled substance was properly
sentenced under § 58-37-8, which is specifically designed to prohibit petitioner's act, instead of this section, which deals with offenses
of an entirely different nature. Helmuth v.
Morris, 598 P.2d 333 (Utah 1979).
Signature.
-In general.
Toestablish falsity of signature it must have

76-6-501

been made to appear not only that person
whose name was signed to instrument had not
signed it, but also that his name had been
signed without authority. State v. Jones, 81
Utah 503, 20 P.2d 614 (1933).

-Authority to sign another's name.
It was not forgery for one person to have
written another's name with authority. State v.
Jones, 81 Utah 503, 20 P.2d 614 (1933).
Where person whose name appeared on
check testified that he had not signed check,
but did not testify that he had not authorized
another to sign his name, conviction of defendant of forgery for passing forged check was
improper. State v. Jones, 81 Utah 503, 20 P.2d
614 (1933).
Standard of proof.
Before defendant could be convicted of passing forged check, state must have proven beyond reasonable doubt that check had been
forged. State v. Jones, 81 Utah 503, 20 P.2d 614
(1933).
Uttering.
Offering forged ~heck to clerk in store with
knowledge of its falsity and with intent to
defraud constituted uttering. State v. Green, 89
Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750 (1936).
Variance.
Where check showed endorsement, and information charging offense of forgery did not set
out such endorsement, there was no material
variance. State v. Jones, 81 Utah 503, 20 P.2d
614 (1933).
Verdict.
Verdict of guilty of uttering forged instrument was not contrary to instruction on crime
of forging instrument which stated that defendant should not be convicted unless jury should
find that defendant wrote instrument and was
not authorized to do so by person whose name
was appended thereto. State v. Gorham, 93
Utah 274, 72 P.2d 656 (1937); State v. Jensen,
103 Utah 478, 136 P.2d 949 (1943).
Finding of guilty of crime of uttering forged
instrument was not finding of guilty of forging
instrument, and did not require finding of
guilty of latter crime to support it. State v.
Gorham, 93 Utah 274, 72 P.2d 656 (1937); State
v. Jensen, 103 Utah 478, 136 P.2d 949 (1943).
Cited in State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Gardner, 827 P.2d
980 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 36 Am. Jur. 2d Forgery § 1.
C.J.S. - 37 C.J.S. Forgery § 1.
A.L.R. - Procuring signature by fraud as
forgery, 11 A.L.R.3d 1074.

76-6-502.

Possession
ing.

Criminal liability for theft of, interference
with, or unauthorized use of, computer programs, files, or systems, 51 A.L.R.4th 971.
Key Numbers. - Forgery ®a> 1.

of forged writing or device for writ-

Any person who, with intent to defraud, knowingly possesses any writing
that is a forgery as defined in Section 76-6-501, or who with intent to defraud
knowingly possesses any device for making any such writing, is guilty of a
felony of the third degree, except where the altering, making, completion,
execution, issuance, transfer, publication, or utterance of such writing would
constitute a class A misdemeanor, in which event the possession of the writing
or device for making such a writing shall constitute a class A misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-502, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-502; 1974, ch. 32, § 20.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 36 Am. J ur. 2d Forgery § 44.
C.J.S. - 37 C.J.S. Forgery § 78.

76-6-503.

Fraudulent

Key Numbers. - Forgery

handling of recordable

®a>

17.

writings.

(1) Any person who with intent to deceive or injure anyone falsifies,
destroys, removes, or conceals any will, deed, mortgage, security instrument,
or other writing for which the law provides public recording is guilty of
fraudulent handling of recordable writings.
(2) Fraudulent handling of recordable writings is a felony of the third
degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-503, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-503.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Articles of incorporation.
Since former § 16-10-50 required articles of
incorporation to be filed and not recorded, they
were not writings for which the law provides
public recording, and the forgery of incorpora-

tor's signature upon a company's articles of
incorporation was not an offense within the
scope of this section. State v. Noren, 621 P.2d
1224 (Utah 1980).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 36 Am. Jur. 2d Forgery§ 15.
C.J.S. - 37 C.J.S. Forgery§ 12.
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76-6-504. Tampering with records.
(1) Any person who, having no privilege to do so, knowingly falsifies,
destroys, removes, or conceals any writing, other than the writings enumerated in Section 76-6-503, or record, public or private, with intent to deceive or
injure any person or to conceal any wrongdoing is guilty of tampering with
records.
(2) Tampering with records is a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-504, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-504.
Cross-References. - Falsification or alteration of government records, § 76-8-511.

Falsifying public accounts, § 76-8-402.
Mutilating or destroying public records,
§§ 76-8-412, 76-8-413.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
company's articles of incorporation is an offense
within the scope of this section. State v. Noren,
621 P.2d 1224 (Utah 1980).

ANALYSIS

Applicatio n.
Articles of incorporation.
Officer's destruction of records.

Application.
Section 76-8-412 applies to an officer having
the custody of any record, whereas this section
applies to any person. State v. Hales, 652 P.2d
1290 (Utah 1982).
Articles of incorporation.
Forgery of incorporator's signature upon a

Officer's destruction of records.
Former town recorder was properly charged
with a felony and punished under § 76-8-412,
rather than charged with a misdemeanor under
this section, for destroying the town records in
her custody after her resignation from office
instead of turning the records over to her successor in office. State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290
(Utah 1982).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am.Jur. 2d. - 36 Am. Jur. 2d Forgery§ 15.
C.J.S. - 37 C.J.S. Forgery § 12.
A.L.R. - What constitutes a public record or

document within statute making falsification,

forgery, mutilation, removal, or other misuse
thereof an offense, 75 A.L.R.4th 1067.
Key Numbers. - Forgery e=> 15.

76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft - Presumption.
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee
and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft.
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check or draft for
which payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or
draft would not be paid if he had no account with the drawee at the time of
issue.
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft is
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft ifhe fails
to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the refused
check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the check or
draft's nonpayment.
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(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be punished as follows:
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts made or drawn in
this state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum of
not more than $200, such offense shall be a class B misdemeanor.
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding
$200 but not more than $300, such offense shall be a class A misdemeanor.
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding
$300 but not more than $1,000, such offense shall be a felony of the third
degree.
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding
$1,000, such offense shall be a second degree felony.
History: C. 1953, 78-6-505, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 198, § 78-8-505; 1977, ch. 91, § 1;
1983, ch. 92, § 1.

Cross-References. suer,§§ 7-15-1, 7-15-2.

Civil liability of is-

NOTES TO DECISIONS
material element in the offense of issuing a bad
check; intent to defraud is not a necessary
element. State v. Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314
(Utah 1983).
Drawee's refusing payment is an essential
element of the crime of issuing a bad check.
State v. Coando, 784 P.2d 1228 (Utah Ct. App.
1989), aff'd, 858 P.2d 926 (1992).

ANALYSIS

Agreement between drawer and payee.
Double jeopardy.
Elements of offense.
Evidence.
-In ·general.
-Other bad checks.
Fictitious name.
Instructions.
Intent.
Jurisdiction.
Knowledge.
Malicious prosecution.
Omission of payee name in check.
Payment for labor.
Penalties.
Postdated check.
Thing of value.

Evidence.

Agreement between drawer and payee.
Conviction under former§ 76-20-11 was improper where receiver of check understood
check was to be held for time before it was to be
cashed, that drawer had sufficient credit, and
elements of fraud by drawer and reliance by
payee were lacking. State v. Trogstad, 98 Utah
565, 100 P.2d 564 (1940).
Double jeopardy.
Defendant convicted of misdemeanor for
writing check on insufficient funds and also
convicted of felony on combination of other
checks, all cashed within a six-month period,
was not subjected to double jeopardy. State v.
Dolan, 28 Utah 2d 331, 502 P.2d 549 (1972).
Elements of offense.
Knowledge of the account's depletion is a

-In general.
Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction
of issuing check against insufficient funds
where worthlessness of check was undisputed.
State v. Myers, 15 Utah 2d 130, 388 P.2d 801
(1964).
Evidence held to be sufficient to show that
the defendant had the requisite intent to have
been guilty of issuing a bad check. See State v.
McClain, 706 P.2d 603 (Utah 1985).
In a prosecution for issuing bad checks, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting evidence of nine returned checks drawn
by the defendants, which checks were not at
issue, to be presented to the jury, since the
admission of the checks was to attack the
credibility of both the defendant and her father
as witnesses, and to show knowledge, intent, or
absence of mistake. State v. McClain, 706 P.2d
603 (Utah 1985).
-Other bad checks.
Admission of evidence that defendant had
drawn other checks with insufficient funds was
not prejudicial where other offense arose from
same transaction giving rise to instant prosecution. State v. Bettis, 27 Utah 2d 373, 496 P.2d
715 (1972).
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Fictitious name.
Evidence that defendant signed check by
fictitious name and used it in payment for
goods and for cash supported conviction under
former statute which made passing of fictitious
check a felony, as against contention that all
that was proved was offense of uttering check
drawn on insufficient funds. State v. Tinnin, 64
Utah 587, 232 P. 543, 43 A.L.R. 46 (1925).
Instructions.
It was reversible error to instruct as to
whether subsequent payment of amount of
check would constitute defense without instructing as to whether intention to defraud
was present at time the check was issued. State
v. Scott, 105 Utah 31, 140 P.2d 929 (1943).
Trial court erred in instructing that defendant's failure to have sufficient funds or credit
at bank at time he wrote check in question
would be prima facie evidence of intent to
defraud where, before writing check, defendant
had phoned bank to ascertain validity of check
he intended to deposit to cover check he was
about to write, and where defendant did deposit
sufficient funds to cover check; such evidence
raised reasonable doubt as to defendant's intent to defraud at time of making and delivering check that eventually bounced. State v.
Coleman, 17 Utah 2d 166, 406 P.2d 308 (1965).
Intent.
Where defendant wrote bad check for purchase of certificate of deposit, and attempted to
cancelor close the certificate on same day, there
was not sufficient evidence to prove intent to
obtain money or property, since certificate had
no actual worth until defendant's check cleared;
thus, the defendant's action amounted to nothing more than writing himself a worthless
check.State v. Green, 672 P.2d 400 (Utah 1983).

76-6-505

Malicious prosecution.
Corporation was not liable for malicious prosecution where local agent initiated prosecution
for issuance of check without sufficient funds,
and he did so without his principal's express
authority, but whether agent was liable for
arrest and imprisonment of plaintiff was jury
question as to probable cause for agent's belief
in plaintiff's guilt and good faith of agent.
Sweatman v. Linton, 66 Utah 208, 241 P. 309
(1925).
Omission of payee name in check.
Defendant was properly convicted of issuing
check against insufficient funds, though he left
payee line blank; check remained negotiable
instrument and any due holder was entitled to
fill in payee blank and check then became an
order on named bank. State v. Donaldson, 14
Utah 2d 401, 385 P.2d 151 (1963).
Payment for labor.
Issuance of check against insufficient funds
to repairman in return for "parts and services"
violated statute which prohibited such issuance
for the payment of money, or wages for labor
performed. State v. Pfannenstiel, 22 Utah 2d
31, 448 P.2d 346 (1968).
Penalties.
Sentencing under former statute of various
defendants to same number of years even
though checks varied in amount from $5.00 to
$50 was not violation of due process or equal
protection clauses of Constitution. Andrus v.
Turner, 421 F.2d 290 (10th Cir. 1970).

Jurisdiction.
Where drawee bank's refusal of payment
occurredin Utah, the state had proper jurisdiction to prosecute Indian defendant for all bad
checks written on the bank. State v. Coando,
784 P.2d 1229 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Postdated check.
In spite of difficulty in proving present existing intent to defraud where check was postdated, if payee, acting reasonably, accepted
check as one of current date, and facts would
support a finding beyond reasonable doubt that
defendant willfully, with intent to defraud,
passed worthless check, question of his guilt of
issuing check against insufficient funds would
have been submitted to jury. State v. Bruce, 1
Utah 2d 136, 262 P.2d 960 (1953).

Knowledge.
Defendant's trial counsel could not compel
the prosecution to charge him under Subsection
(2) rather than Subsection (1) since the evidencewas clearly susceptible to the interpretation that defendant knew that the checks he
issued would not be honored at the time of
presentment to his bank. State v. Bartholomew,
724 P.2d 352 (Utah 1986).

Thing of value.
Irrespective of whether defendant actually
acquired legal title to stock booked into his
company's account, he did receive "a thing of
value" within the meaning of this section by
acquiring the rights to order the stock in his
account sold and to receive any profit that
might be realized from such a sale. State v.
Bartholomew, 724 P.2d 352 (Utah 1986).
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Am. Jur. 2d. - 32 Am. Jur. 2d False Pretenses§ 77.
C.J.S. - 35 C.J.S. False Pretenses § 21.
A.L.R. - Reasonable expectation of payment
as affecting offense under "worthless check"
statutes, 9 A.L.R.3d 719.
Personal liability of officers or directors of

76-6-506.

Financial
tions.

corporation on corporate checks issued against
insufficient funds, 47 A.L.R.3d 1250.
Application of "bad check" statute with respect to postdated checks, 52 A.L.R.3d 464.
Cashing check at bank at which account is
maintained as violation of bad check statutes,
75 A.L.R.3d 1080.

transaction

card offenses

-

Defini-

For purposes of this part:
( 1) "Authorized credit card merchant" means a person as defined in
Section 68-3-12 who is authorized by an issuer to furnish money, goods,
services, or anything else of value upon presentation of a financial
transaction card by a card holder and to present valid credit card sales
drafts to the issuer for payment.
(2) "Automated banking device" means any machine which, when
properly activated by a financial transaction card or a personal identification code, may be used for any of the purposes for which a financial
transaction card may be used.
(3) "Card holder" means any person or organization named on the face
of a financial transaction card to whom or for whose benefit a financial
transaction card is issued by an issuer.
(4) "Credit card sales draft"means any sales slip, draft, or other written
or electronic record of a sale of money, goods, services, or anything else of
value made or purported to be made to or at the request of a card holder
with a financial transaction card, financial transaction card credit number, or personal identification code, whether the record of the sale or
purported sale is evidenced by a sales draft, voucher, or other similar
document in writing or electronically recorded and transmitted.
(5) "Financial transaction card" means:
(a) any credit card, credit plate, bank services card, banking card,
check guarantee card, debit card, telephone credit card, or any other
card, issued by an issuer for the use of the card holder in obtaining
money, goods, services, or anything else of value on credit, or in
certifying or guaranteeing to a person or business the availability to
the card holder of the funds on deposit that are equal to or greater
than the amount necessary to honor a draft or check payable to the
order of the person or business; or
(b) any instrument or device used in providing the card holder
access to a demand or time deposit account for the purpose of making
deposits of money or checks in the account, or withdrawing funds from
the account in the form of money, money orders, travelers' checks or
other form representing value, or transferring funds from any demand or time deposit account to any credit card account in full or
partial satisfaction of any outstanding balance existing in the credit
card account.
(6) "Issuer" means a business organization or financial institution or its
agent that issues a financial transaction card.
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(7) "Personal identification code" means any numerical or alphabetical
code assigned to a card holder by the issuer to permit the authorized
electronic use of his financial transaction card.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, added Subsections (1) and (4) and redesignated former Subsections (1) to (5) as Subsections (2), (3), (5), (6),
and (7), respectively.

History: C. 1953, 76-6-506, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 96, § 1; 1991, ch. 60, § 2.
Repeals and Reenactments.
- Laws
1983, ch. 96, § 1 repealed former § 76-6-506
(L. 1977, ch. 90, § 1), relating to fraudulent use
of a credit card, and enacted present § 76-6506.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 32 Am. Jur. 2d False Pretenses§ 35.
C.J.S. - 35 C.J.S. False Pretenses § 24.
A.L.R.- Criminal liability for unauthorized

use of credit card, 24 A.L.R.3d 986.
Credit card issuer's liability, under state
laws, for wrongful billing, cancellation, dishonor, or disclosure, 53 A.L.R.4th 231.

76-6-506.1. Financial transaction card offenses - Falsely
making, coding, or signing card - Falsely signing evidence of card transaction.
Any person who, with intent to defraud, counterfeits, falsely makes, embosses, or encodes magnetically or electronically any financial transaction
card, or who, with intent to defraud, uses through carbon or other impressions
or copies of credit card sales drafts or through any other means, the account
number or personal identification code of a card holder in the creation of a
fictitious or counterfeit credit card sales draft, or who, with intent to defraud,
signs the name of another or a fictitious name to a financial transaction card,
credit card sales draft, or any instrument for the payment of money which
evidences a financial transaction card transaction, is guilty of a felony of the
seconddegree.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-506.1, enacted by L.
1983,ch. 96, § 2; 1991, ch. 60, § 3.
Repeals and Reenactments.
- Laws
1983,ch. 96, § 2 repealed former§ 76-6-506.1
(L. 1977, ch. 90, § 2), relating to classification
ofoffenses, and enacted present§ 76-6-506.1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effectiveApril 29, 1991, inserted "or who,

with intent to defraud, uses through carbon or
other impressions or copies of credit card sales
drafts or through any other means, the account
number or personal identification code of a card
holder in the creation of a fictitious or counterfeit credit card sales draft" and made related
changes and substituted "credit card" for "sales
slip" before "sales draft."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Section76-6-506.2 distinguished.
Cited.

Section 76-6-506.2 distinguished.
This section and § 76-6-506.2 do not proscribe identical conduct because they do not

contain the same elements: This section requires proof of a "signing" of a sales slip
whereas § 76-6-506.2 instead requires proof of
the value of items fraudulently purchased.
State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747 (Utah 1986).

Cited in State v. Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216
(Utah 1986).
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Financial transaction card offenses - Unlawful use of card or automated banking device False application for card.

It is unlawful for any person to:
(1) knowingly, with intent to defraud, obtain or attempt to obtain credit
or purchase or attempt to purchase goods, property, or services, by the use
of a false, fictitious, altered, counterfeit, revoked, expired, stolen, or
fraudulently obtained financial transaction card, by any financial transaction card credit number, personal identification code, or by the use of a
financial transaction card not authorized by the issuer or the card holder;
(2) use a financial transaction card, with intent to defraud, to knowingly and willfully exceed the actual balance of a demand or time deposit
account;
(3) use a financial transaction card, with intent to defraud, to willfully
exceed an authorized credit line by $500 or more, or by 50% of such line,
whichever is greater;
( 4) willfully, with intent to defraud, deposit into his or any other
account by means of an automated banking device a false, fictitious,
forged, altered, or counterfeit check, draft, money order, or any other
similar document;
(5) make application for a :financial transaction card to an issuer, while
knowingly making or causing to be made a false statement or report
relative to his name, occupation, financial condition, assets, or to willfully
and substantially undervalue or understate any indebtedness for the
purposes of influencing the issuer to issue the :financial transaction card;
or
(6) knowingly, with intent to defraud any authorized credit card merchant, card holder, or issuer, sell or attempt to sell credit card sales drafts
to an authorized credit card merchant or any other person or organization,
for any consideration whether at a discount or otherwise, or present or
cause to be presented to the issuer or an authorized credit card merchant,
for payment or collection, any such credit card sales draft, if:
(i) the draft is counterfeit or :fictitious;
(ii) the purported sales evidenced by any such credit card sales
draft did not take place;
(iii) the purported sale was not authorized by the card holder;
(iv) the items or services purported to be sold as evidenced by the
credit card sales drafts are not delivered or rendered to the card
holder or person intended to receive them; or
(v) when delivered or rendered, the goods or services are materially
different or of materially lesser value or quality than represented by
the seller or his agent to the purchaser, or have substantial discrepancies from goods or services impliedly represented by the purchase
price when compared with the actual goods or services delivered or
rendered.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-506.2, enacted by L.
1983,ch.96,§
3; 1991,ch.60, § 4.
Repeals and Reenactments.
- Laws
1983, ch. 96, § 3 repealed former § 76-6-506.2

(L. 1977, ch. 90, § 3), relating to taking a credit
card from a person, and enacted present § 766-506.2.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amend-
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ment, effective April 29, 1991, added Subsection (6) and made minor stylistic changes in
Subsections (4) and (5).
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Defenses.
-Property obtained by third party.
Section 76-6-506.1 distinguished.
Value question of fact.

Defenses.
-Property obtained by third party.
One who was otherwise guilty of obtaining or
attempting to obtain automobile tires by unauthorized use of credit card made np defense by
showing that tires were picked up by wife and
third party. Combs v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 397,
483 P.2d 437 (1971).

Section 76-6-506.1 distinguished.
This section and § 76-6-506.1 do not proscribe identical conduct because they do not
contain the same elements: Section 76-6-506.1
requires proof of a "signing'' of a sales slip
whereas this section instead requires proof of
the value of items fraudulently purchased.
State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747 (Utah 1986).
Value question of fact.
Trial court erred in instructing jury that
under former statute ''value" meant "retail"
value; value was a question of fact to be determined by' the jury. State v. Harris, 30 Utah 2d
439, 519 P.2d 247 (1974).

76-6-506.3. Financial transaction ~ard offenses - Unlawful acquisition, possession or transfer of card.
It is unlawful for any person to:
(1) Acquire a financial transaction card from another without the
consent of the card holder or the issuer, or, with the knowledge that it has
been acquired without consent, receive a financial transaction card with
intent to use it in violation of Section 76-6-506.2, or sell or transfer a
financial transaction card to another person with the knowledge that it
will be used in violation of Section 76-6-506.2; or
(2) Acquire a financial tran~action card that he knows was lost, mislaid,
or delivered under a mistake as to the identity or address of the card
holder, and retain possession with intent to use it in violation of Section
76-6-506.2, or sell or transfer a financial transaction card to another
person with the knowledge that it will be used in violation of Section
76-6-506.2.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-506.3, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 96, § 4.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws
1983,ch. 96, § 4 repealed former § 76-6-506.3

(L. 1977, ch. 90, § 4), relating to possession or
receipt of a credit card, and enacted present
§ 76-6-506.3.

76-6-506.4. Financial transaction card offenses
erty obtained by unlawful conduct.

-

Prop-

It is unlawful for any person to receive, retain, conceal, possess, or dispose of
personal property, cash, or other form representing value, if he knows or has
reason to believe the property, cash, or other form representing value has been
obtained through unlawful conduct described in Section 76-6-506.1, 76-6506.2, or 76-6-506.3.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-506.4, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 96, § 5.
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Financial
fication.

transaction

card offenses -

Classi-

(1) Any person found guilty of unlawful con.duct described in Section
76-6-506.2, 76-6-506.3, 76-6-506.4, or 76-6-506.6 is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or
thing obtained or sought to be obtained, is $100 or less;
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or
thing obtained or sought to be obtained, is more than $100 but does not
exceed $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained, is more than $1,000 but does not exceed
$10,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or
thing obtained or sought to be obtained, is more than $10,000 but does not
exceed $100,000;
(e) a first degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained, is $100,000 or more.
(2) Each occurrence constituting such unlawful conduct is a separate
offense.
(3) The determination of the degree of any offense under this section shall be
measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought
to be obtained by the unlawful conduct.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-506.5, enacted by L.
1983,ch.96,§
6;1991,ch.60,§
5;1991,ch.
241, § 91.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment by ch. 60, effective April 29, 1991, added
the Subsection (1) designation; in Subsection
(1), inserted "or 76-6-506.6" and made related
stylistic changes in the first sentence, deleted
"a class A misdemeanor" at the end of the first
sentence, and deleted the former second sentence, which read "If the retail value of the
money, goods, or services obtained or attempted

76-6-506.6.

to be obtained through unlawful conduct described in Section 76-6-506.2 or 76-6-506.4 is
$250 or more, the person is guilty of a felony of
the third degree"; and added Subsections (l)(a)
through (l)(e), (2), and (3).
Thll l991 amendment by ch. 241, effective
April 29, 1991, substituted "class B" for "class
N' in the first sentence.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
co"unsel.

Financial transaction card offenses - Unauthorized factoring of credit card sales drafts.

It is unlawful for any person, knowingiy, with intent to defraud, acting
without the express authorization of the issuer, to employ, solicit, or otherwise
cause an authorized credit card merchant, or for the authorized credit card
merchant himself, to present any credit card sales draft to the issuer for
payment pertaining to any sale or purported sale of goods or services which
was not made by the authorized credit card merchant in the ordinary course of
business.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-506.6, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 60, § 6.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1991, ch. 60 be-

came effective on April 29, 1991, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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76-6-507. Deceptive
Defense.

business

practices

Definitions

-

(1) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, in the course of business,
he:
(a) uses or possesses for use a false weight or measure, or any other
device for falsely determining or recording any quality or quantity;
(b) takes or attempts to take more than the represented quantity of any
commodity or service when as buyer he furnishes the weight or measure;
or
(c) sells, offers, or exposes for sale adulterated or mislabeled commodities.
(2) (a) "Adulterated" means varying from the standard of composition or
quality prescribed, or pursuant to any statute providing criminal penalties
for a variance, or set by established commercial usage.
(b) "Mislabeled" means varying from the standard of truth or disclosure
in labeling prescribed by or pursuant to any statute providing criminal
penalties for a variance, or set by established commercial usage[.]
(3) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the
defendant's conduct was not knowing or reckless.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-507, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-507; 1985, ch. 157, § 1.
Compiler's Notes. - The period at the end
of Subsection (2) was added by the compiler. A
period should have been substituted for"; or" at
the end of Subsection (2) when the section was
amended.
Cross-References. - Adulterated or mis-

branded dairy products, sale prohibited, § 4-310.
Adulterated or misbranded food, animal drug
or device, sale prohibited, defenses, §§ 4-5-3,
4-5-4.
False weights and measures, § 4-9-12.
Medical practitioners, fraudulent practices
by, § 58-12-20.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
civil liability. Christensen v. Lelis Automatic
Transmission Serv., Inc., 24 Utah 2d 165, 467
P.2d 605 (1970).

Civil liability.
Theft distinguished.

Civil liability.
Complaint alleging false, deceptive or misleading advertising and misrepresentation of
guarantee was improperly dismissed for failure
to state claim upon which relief could be
granted; under the circumstances, plaintiff
might have had a civil cause of action because a
violation of former § 76-4-1 could give rise to

Theft distinguished.
Where defendant took money from investors
for the purchase of fruit juice vending machines
and exercised control over that money with the
criminal intent to permanently deprive investors of it and not deliver any machines at all,
such conduct constituted a theft offense and not
merely a deceptive business practice. State v.
Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 32 Am. Jur. 2d False Pretenses§ 16.
C.J.S. - 37 C.J.S. Fraud§ 154.
A.L.R.- What goods or property are "used,"

"secondhand," or the like, for purposes of state
consumer laws prohibiting claims that such
items are new, 59 A.L.R.4th 1192.
Key Numbers. - Fraud
68.5.
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Bribery of or receiving bribe by person in the
business of selection, appraisal, or criticism of
goods or services.

( 1) A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor when, without the consent of
the employer or principal, contrary to the interests of the employer or
principal:
(a) he confers, offers, or agrees to confer upon the empl0yee, agent, or
fiduciary of an employer or principal any benefit with the purpose of
influencing the conduct of the employee, agent, or fiduciary in relating to
his employer's or principal's affairs; or
(b) he, as an employee, agent, or fiduciary of an employer or principal,
solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit from another upon an
agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence his conduct in
relation to his employer's or principal's affairs; provided that this section
does not apply to inducements made or accepted solely for the purpose of
causing a change in employment by an employee, agent, or fiduciary.
(2) A person is guilty of violation of this section if he holds himself out to the
public as being engaged in the business of making disinterested selection,
appraisal, or criticism of goods or services and he solicits, accepts, or agrees to
accept any benefit to influence his selection, appraisal, or criticism.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-508, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-508; 1991, ch. 241, § 92.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amend-

ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted
"class N for "class B" in Subsection (1).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
manager of auto sales agency, who bought the
advertising without the authorization of his
principal and went on the trips himself, since it
did not appear that the station knew of any
impropriety. KUTV, Inc. v. Motor Sales, Inc.,
546 P.2d 239 (Utah 1976).

ANALYSIS

Business gifts.
Cited.

Business gifts.
Offer by television station of expense-free
trips to customers who purchased a certain
amount of advertising did not violate former
section when offer was made to local branch

Cited in State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Recent Developments
in Utah Law - Judicial Decisions -Antitrust,
1989 Utah L. Rev. 153.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 12 Am. Jur. 2d Bribery§§ 3,
16.
C.J.S.-11 C.J.S. Bribery§ 2.
A.L.R. ,- Validity and construction of stat-

76-6-509.

utes punishing commercial bribery, 1 A.L.R.3d
1350.
Criminal liability of corporation for bribery
or conspiracy to bribe public official, 52
A.L.R.3d 1274.
Key Numbers. - Bribery ea> 2.

Bribery of a labor official.

(1) Any person who offers, confers, or agrees to confer upon a labor officiid
any benefit with intent to influence him in respect to any of his acts, decisions,
or duties as a labor official is guilty of bribery of a labor official.
(2) Bribery of a labor official is a felony of the third degree.
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History: C. 1953, 76-6-509, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-509.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 12 Am. Jur. 2d Bribery§ 15.
C.J.S. - 11 C.J.S. Bribery § 2.

76-6-510. Bribe receiving by a labor official.
(1) Any labor official who solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit
from another person upon an agreement or understanding that the benefit will
influence him in any of his acts, decisions, or duties as a labor official is guilty
of bribe receiving by a labor official.
(2) Bribe receiving by a labor official is a felony of the third degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-510, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-510.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am.Jur. 2d. - 12 Am. J ur. 2d Bribery § 15.
C.J.S. - 11 C.J.S. Bribery § 2.

76-6-511. Defrauding creditors.
A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if:
(1) he destroys, removes, conceals, encumbers, transfers, or otherwise
deals with property subject to a security interest with a purpose to hinder
enforcement of that interest; or
(2) knowing that proceedings have been or are about to be instituted for
the appointment of a person entitled to administer property for the benefit
of creditors, he:
(a) destroys, removes, conceals, encumbers, transfers, or otherwise
deals with any property with a purpose to defeat or obstruct the claim
of any creditor, or otherwise to obstruct the operation of any law
relating to administration of property for the benefit of creditors; or
(b) presents to any creditor or to an assignee for the benefit of
creditors, orally or in writing, any statement relating to the debtor's
estate, knowing that a material part of such statement is false.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-511, enacted by L.
1973,ch. 196, § 76-6-511; 1991, ch. 241, § 93.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted

"class A" for "class B" near the beginning of the
section.
Cross-References. - Conveyance to hinder
or defraud, §§ 25-6-1 et seq., 70A-2-402.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am, Jur. 2d. - 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraudulent
Conveyances § 2.
C.J.S. - 37 C.J.S. Fraudulent Conveyances
§ 469.

A.L.R. - Elements and proof of crime of
improper sale, removal, concealment, or disposal of property subject to security interest
under UCC, 48 A.L.R.4th 819.
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Acceptance
institution.

of deposit

by insolvent

financial

A person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if:
(1) As an officer, manager, or other person participating in the direction
of a financial institution, as defined in Section 76-6-411, he receives or
permits receipt of a deposit or other investment knowing that the
institution is or is about to become unable, from any cause, to pay its
obligations in the ordinary course of business; and
(2) He knows that the person making the payment to the institution is
unaware of such present or prospective inability.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-512, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-512.

Compiler's Notes. -Section 76-6-411, cited
in Subsection (1), was repealed in 1974.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 10 Am. J ur. 2d Banks § 242.
C.J.S. - 9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking§ 156.

76-6-513.

Key Numbers. 82(2), 83, 84.

Banks and Banking e=>

Definitions - Unlawful dealing of property by a
fiduciary - Penalties.

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Fiduciary" is as defined in Section 22-1-1.
(b) "Financial institution" means "depository institution" and "trust
company" as defined in Section 7-1-103.
(c) "Governmental entity" is as defined in Section 63-30-2.
(d) "Person" does not include a financial institution whose fiduciary
functions are supervised by the Department of Financial Institutions or a
federal regulatory agency.
(e) "Property" is as defined in Section 76-6-401.
(f) "Public moneys" is as defined in Section 76-8-401.
(2) A person is guilty of unlawfully dealing with property by a fiduciary ifhe
deals with property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or property
of a governmental entity, public moneys, or of a financial institution, in a
manner which he knows is a violation of his duty and which involves
substantial risk of loss or detriment to the owner or to a person for whose
benefit the property was entrusted. A violation of this subsection is punishable
under Section 76-6-412.
(3) (a) A person acting as a fiduciary is guilty of a violation of this
subsection if, without permission of the owner of the property or some
other person with authority to give permission, he pledges as collateral for
a personal loan, or as collateral for the benefit of some party, other than
the owner or the person for whose benefit the property was entrusted, the
property that has been entrusted to the fiduciary.
(b) An offense under Subsection (a) is punishable as:
(i) a felony of the third degree if the value of the property wrongfully pledged exceeds $1,000;
(ii) a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property is more than
$250, but not more than $1,000 or the actor has been twice before
convicted of theft, robbery, burglary with intent to commit theft, or
unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary; or
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(iii) a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property is $250 or
less.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-513, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-513; 1983, ch. 91, § 1;
1994, ch. 70, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, added Subsections
(1) and (3), renumbering former Subsection (1)
as Subsection (2); in Subsection (2), substituted

"unlawfully dealing with property by a fiduciary" for "theft, punishable under Section 766-412" and "a governmental entity" for "the
government" and inserted "public moneys" and
"or detriment" in the first sentence and added
the second sentence; and deleted former Subsection (2), which contained definitions.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Note, Utah's Statute
Permitting Limits on Corporate Directors' Lia-

bility: A Guide for Lawyers and Directors, 1988
Utah L. Rev. 847.

76-6-514. Bribery or threat to influence

contest.

A person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if:
(1) With a purpose to influence any participant or prospective participant not to give his best efforts in a publicly exhibited contest, he confers
or offers or agrees to confer any benefit upon or threatens any injury to a
participant or prospective participant; or
(2) With a purpose to influence an official in a publicly exhibited contest
to perform his duties improperly, he confers or offers or agrees to confer
any benefit upon or threatens any injury to such official; or
(3) With a purpose to influence the outcome of a publicly exhibited
contest, he tampers with any person, animal, or thing contrary to the rules
and usages purporting to govern the contest; or
(4) He knowingly solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit, the
giving of which would be criminal under [Subsection] (1) or (2).
History: C. 1953, 76-6-514, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-514.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 12 Am. J ur. 2d Bribery § 16.
C.J.S. - 11 C.J.S. Bribery§ 2.
A.L.R.- Recovery in tort for wrongful inter-

ference with chance to win game, sporting
event, or contest, 85 A.L.R.4th 1048.

76-6-515. Using or making slugs.
(1) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if:
(a) With a purpose to defraud the supplier of property or a service
offered or sold by means of a coin machine, he inserts, deposits, or uses a
slug in that machine; or
(b) He makes, possesses, or disposes of a slug with the purpose of
enabling a person to use it fraudulently in a coin machine.
(2) As used in this section:
(a) "Coin machine" means any mechanical or electronic device or
receptacle designed to receive a coin or bill of a certain denomination, or a
token made for the purpose, and, in return for the insertion or deposit
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thereof, automatically to offer, provide, assist in providing or permit the
acquisition of property or a public or private service.
(b) "Slug'' means any object which, by virtue of its size, shape, or other
quality, is capable of being inserted, deposited, or otherwise used in a coin
machine as an improper substitute for a genuine coin, bill, or token.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-515, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-515.

76-6-516.

Conveyance ofrealestate
out wife's consent.

by married man with-

Any married man who falsely represents himself as unmarried and under
such representation knowingly conveys or mortgages real estate situate in this
state, without the assent or concurrence of his wife when such consent or
concurrence is necessary to relinquish her inchoate statutory interest therein,
is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-516, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-516.
Cross-References. - Homesteads generally, § 78-23-3 et seq.

Omission of spouse from will, § 75-2-301.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Sale of husband's interest.
As to husband's right to sell his interest in
property that was not homestead property, subject only to his wife's one-third interest in case

she continued to be his wife and survived him,
as against contention that husband violated
former § 76-20-10, see Adamson v. Adamson,
55 Utah 544, 188 P. 635 (1920).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. tenses§ 30.

76-6-517.

32 Am. Jur. 2d False Pre-

C.J.S. - 35 C.J.S. False Pretenses § 5.

Making a false credit report.

(1) Any person who knowingly makes a materially false or misleading
written statement to obtain property or credit for himself or another is guilty
of making a false credit report.
(2) Making a false credit report is a class A misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-517, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-517.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. tenses§ 28.

76-6-518.

32 Am. Jur. 2d False Pre-

C.J.S. - 35 C.J.S. False Pretenses § 13.
Key Numbers. - False Pretenses ,g,,, 7(4).

Criminal simulation.

(1) A person is guilty of criminal simulation if, with intent to defraud
another:
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(a) He makes or alters an object in whole or in part so that it appears to
have value because of age, antiquity, rarity, source, or authorship that it
does not have; or
(b) He sells, passes, or otherwise utters an object so made or altered; or
(c) He possesses an object so made or altered with intent to sell, pass, or
otherwise utter it; or
(d) He authenticates or certifies an object so made or altered as genuine
or as different from what it is.
(2) Criminal simulation is punishable as follows:
(a) If the value defrauded or intended to be defrauded is less than $100,
the offense is a class B misdemeanor.
•
(b) If the value defrauded or intended to be defrauded exceeds $100 but
is less than $1,000, the offense is a class A misdemeanor.
(c) If the value defrauded or intended to be defrauded exceeds $1,000
but is less than $2,500, the offense is a felony of the third degree.
(d) If the value defrauded or intended to be defrauded exceeds $2,500,
the offense is a felony of the second degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-518, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-518.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946. State v.
Frampton, 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Application and construction of section.
Manufactured products.
- Baseball gloves.
Value.

Manufactured products.

Constitutionality.
This section is not void for vagueness, since it
clearly indicates the conduct proscribed. State
v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987).
Application and construction of section.
This section is, in a sense, a consumer protection statute and, like other consumer protection statutes (such as the Utah Consumer
Credit Code), must be construed broadly. State
v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987).
This section is not preempted by the federal

-Baseball gloves.
This section prescribes penalties for those
who forge, alter, or possess modern commercially manufactured products. Baseball gloves
are undisputedly modern commercially manufactured products. State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d
183 (Utah 1987).
Value.
The value defrauded or intended to be defrauded is that amount which the seller of such
goods receives, or the price for which he holds
the goods out for sale. State v. Frampton, 737
P.2d 183 (Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Recent Developments
in Utah Law - Judicial Decisions - Constitutional Law, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 153.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and
Deceit§ 11.

C.J.S. - 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 154.
A.L.R. - Validity and construction of state
statutes penalizing "criminal simulation" of
goods or merchandise, 72 A.L.R.4th 1071.

76-6-519. Repealed.
Repeals. - Section 76-6-519 (L. 1973, ch.
196, § 76-6-519), relating to pyramid schemes,

was repealed by Laws 1983, ch. 89, § 3. See
§ 76-6a-1 et seq. for present provisions.
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Criminal usury.

(1) A person is guilty of criminal usury when he knowingly engages in or
directly or indirectly provides financing for the business of making loans at a
higher rate of interest or consideration therefor than is authorized by law.
(2) Criminal usury is a felony of the third degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-520, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-520.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 91 C.J.S. Usury § 160.
Key Numbers. - Usury e=o149.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 45 Am. Jur. 2d Interest and
Usury§ 357.

76-6-521.

False or fraudulent
ment as for theft.

insurance

act -

Punish-

(1) A person commits a fraudulent insurance act if that person with intent
to defraud:
(a) presents or causes to be presented any oral or written statement or
representation knowing that the statement or representation contains
false or fraudulent information concerning any fact material to an application for the issuance or renewal of an insurance policy, certificate, or
contract;
(b) presents, or causes to be presented, any oral or written statement or
representation as part of or in support of a claim for payment or other
benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, certificate, or contract, or in
connection with any civil claim asserted for recovery of damages for
personal or bodily injuries or property damage, knowing that the statement or representation contains false or fraudulent information concerning any fact or thing material to the claim;
(c) knowingly accepts a benefit from proceeds derived from a fraudulent
•
insurance act;
(d) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, devises a scheme or artifice to
obtain fees for professional services, or anything of value by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions.
(2) (a) A violation. of Subsection (l)(a) is a class B misdemeanor.
(b) A violation of Subsections (l)(b) through (l)(d), is punishable as in
the manner prescribed by Section 76-10-1801 for communication fraud for
property of like value.
(3) A corporation or association is guilty of the offense of insurance fraud
under the same conditions as those set forth in Section 76-2-204.
(4) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsections (l)(b)
through (l)(d) shall be measured by the total value of all property, money, or
other things obtained or sought to be obtained by the fraudulent insurance act
or acts described in Subsections (l)(b) through (l)(d).
History: C. 1953, 76-6-521, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-521; 1994, ch. 243, § 13.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1994, rewrote this section to such an extent that a detailed analysis is
impracticable.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
claim in regard to damages caused by an explosion and fire in their home was clear from
undisputed evidence that they claimed a nonexistent burglar alarm system and intercom
system. State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123 (Utah
1986).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Fraudulent claim.
Intent.
Presentment of claim.
Restitution.

Constitutionality.
This section is not unconstitutionally vague.
State v. McGehee, 639 P.2d 148 (Utah 1981).
Fraudulent claim.
Before a claim for reimbursement under an
insurance policy may be merely "excessive"
there must be a lesser valid claim which it
exceeds; if there is no valid claim at all, any
claim must be fraudulent. State v. Kitchen, 564
P.2d 760 (Utah 1977).
Intent.
Defendants' intention to submit a fraudulent

Presentment of claim.
An insured's false telephonic notice of an
accident was not the "presentment" of a claim,
in the face of the insurance company's claim
procedures prohibiting payments to a claimant
before receiving bids for repairs and the police
accident report, neither of which was submitted. State v. Wilson, 710 P.2d 801 (Utah 1985).
Restitution.
For a discussion of a restitution order entered in a criminal case arising out of a false
insurance claim, see State v. Chambers, 709
P.2d 339 (Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 44 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance

§ 1371.

C.J.S. - 44 C.J.S. Insurance§ 95.
A.L.R.-Admissibility of polygraph or similar lie detector test results, or willingness to

76-6-522. Definitions
Penalties.

submit to test, on issues of coverage under
insurance policy, or insurer's good-faith belief
that claim was not covered, 7 A.L.R.5th 143.
Key Numbers. - Insurance ,s::, 31.

- Equity skimming of a vehicle

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Broker" means any person who, for compensation of any kind,
arranges for the sale, lease, sublease, or transfer of a vehicle.
(b) "Dealer" means any person engaged in the business of selling,
leasing, or exchanging vehicles for compensation of any kind.
(c) "Lease" means any grant of use or possession of a vehicle for
consideration, with or without an option to buy.
(d) "Security interest" means an interest in a vehicle that secures
payment or performance of an obligation.
(e) "Transfer" means any delivery or conveyance of a vehicle to another
from one person to another.
(f) ''Vehicle" means every device in, upon, or by which any person or
property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, or through
the air or water, or over land and includes a manufactured home or mobile
home as defined in Section 41-la-102.
(2) A dealer or broker or any other person in collusion with a dealer or
broker is guilty of equity skimming of a vehicle if he transfers or arranges the
transfer of a vehicle for consideration or profit, when he knows or should have
known the vehicle is subject to a lease or security interest, without first
obtaining written authorization of the lessor or holder of the security interest.
(3) Equity skimming of a vehicle is a third degree felony.
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( 4) It is a defense to the crime of equity skimming of a vehicle if the accused
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the lease obligation or security
interest has been satisfied within 30 days following the transfer of the vehicle.

History: C. 1953, 76-6-522, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 291, § 1; 1992, ch. 1, § 208.
Amendment Notes. - The 1992 amendment, effei;tive January 30, 1992, substituted
the present code citation in Subsection (l)(f) for

"Section 41-1-1" and made stylistic changes.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1991, ch. 291
became effective on April 29, 1991, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

PART6

RETAIL THEFT
76-6-601.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Merchartdise" means any personal property displayed, held or
offered for sale by a merchant.
(2) "Merchant" means an owner or operator of any retail mercantile
establishment where merchandise is displayed, held or offered for sale and
includes the merchant's employees, servants or agents.
(3) "Minor" means any unmarried person under 18 years of age.
(4) "Peace officer"has the same meaning as provided in Section 77-la-l.
(5) "Premises of a retail mercantile establishment" includes, but is not
limited to, the retail mercantile establishment; any common use areas in
shopping centers and all parking lots or areas set aside for the benefit of
those patrons of the retail mercantile establishment.
(6) "Retail mercantile establishment" means any place where merchandise is displayed, held, or offered for sale to the public.
(7) "Retail value" means the merchant's stated or advertised price of the
merchandise.
(8) "Shopping cart" means those push carts of the types which are
commonly provided by grocery stores, drug stores, or other mercantile
establishments or markets for the use of the public in transporting
commodities in stores and markets from the store to a place outside the
store.
(9) "Under-ring" means to cause the cash register or other sales
recording device to reflect less than the retail value of the merchandise.
History: L. 1979, ch. 78, § 1; 1990, ch. 93,

§ 38; 1993, ch. 234, § 378.

Amendment Notes. - The 1993 amendment, effective July 1, 1993, in Subsection (4),
substituted "has the same meaning as provided" for "means an officer as described" and
deleted ''including a member of the Highway

Patrol" after "Section 77-la-1."
Cross-References. - Civil liability of shoplifter to merchant, §§ 78-11-14 to 78-11-16,
78-11-19.
Detention of suspected shoplifter, arrest, civil
and criminal immunity, §§ 78-11-17, 78-11-18.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Utah Legislative Survey - 1979, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 155.
Recent Developments in Utah Law, 1980
Utah L. Rev. 649.

A.L.R. - Validity, construction, and effect of
statutes establishing shoplifting or its equivalent as separate criminal offense, 64 A.L.R.4th
1088.
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76-6-602. Retail theft, acts constituting.
A person commits the offense of retail theft when he knowingly:
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries away, transfers or causes to be
carried away or transferred, any merchandise displayed, held, stored or
offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment with the intention of
retaining such merchandise or with the intention of depriving the merchant permanently of the possession, use or benefit of such merchandise
without paying the retail value of such merchandise; or
(2) Alters, transfers, or removes any label, price tag, marking, indicia of
value or any other markings which aid in determining value of any
merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale, in a retail mercantile establishment and attempts to purchase such merchandise personally
or in consort with another at less than the retail value with the intention
of depriving the merchant of the retail value of such merchandise; or
(3) Transfers any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale
in a retail mercantile establishment from the container in or on which
such merchandise is displayed to any other container with the intention of
depriving the merchant of the retail value of such merchandise; or
(4) Under-rings with the intention of depriving the merchant of the
retail value of the merchandise; or
(5) Removes a shopping cart from the premises of a retail mercantile
establishment with the intent of depriving the merchant of the possession,
use or benefit of such cart.
History: L. 1979, ch. 78,

§

2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
prive the store of it. State v. Barber, 747 P.2d
436 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

ANALYSIS

Evidence.
-Sufficient.
Lesser included offenses.
Cited.

Evidence.
-Sufficient.
Evidence was sufficient to support the conclusionthat a father directed his sons' taking
and hiding of store property - acts sufficient to
constitute concealment or transfer under this
section- with the intent permanently to de-

76-6-603. Detention
Purposes.

Lesser included offenses.
The crime of carrying a concealed dangerous
weapon is a lesser included offense of seconddegree felony retail theft when the retail theft
is made a felony by the actor's being armed
with a deadly weapon in the course of the
crime. State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
Cited in City of Orem v. Ko-tung Lee, 846
P.2d 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

of suspected

violator by merchant -

Any merchant who has probable cause to believe that a person has
committed retail theft may detain such person, on or off the premises of a retail
mercantile establishment, in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length
of time for all or any of the following purposes:
(1) To make reasonable inquiry as to whether such person has in his
possession unpurchased merchandise and to make reasonable investigation of the ownership of such merchandise;
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(2) To request identification;
(3) To verify such identification;
(4) To make a reasonable request of such person to place or keep in full
view any merchandise such individual may have removed, or which the
merchant has reason to believe he may have removed, from its place of
display or elsewhere, whether for examination, purchase or for any other
reasonable purpose;
(5) To inform a peace officer of the detention of the person and surrender
that person to the custody of a peace officer;
(6) In the case of a minor, to inform a peace officer, the parents,
guardian or other private person interested in the welfare of that minor
immediately, if possible, of this detention and to surrender custody of such
minor to such person.
A merchant may make a detention as permitted herein off the premises of a
retail mercantile establishment only if such detention is pursuant to an
immediate pursuit of such person.
History: L. 1979, ch. 78, § 3.

76-6-604.

Defense to action by person detained.

In any action for false arrest, false imprisonment, unlawful detention,
defamation of character, assault, trespass, or invasion of civil rights brought by
any person detained by the merchant, it shall be a defense to such action that
the merchant detaining such person had probable cause to believe that the
person had committed retail theft and that the merchant acted reasonably
under all circumstances.
History: L. 1979, ch. 78, § 4.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. - Excessiveness or inadequacy of
compensatory damages for false imprisonment
or arrest, 48 A.L.R.4th 165.

76-6-605.

Photographs of items allegedly taken or converted - Admissibility - Procedure.

(1) As used in this section "items" means:
(a) goods or merchandise as defined in Section 76-6-601; and
(b) library materials, as defined in Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 8.
(2) In any prosecution for a violation of Section 76-6-602 or Title 76, Chapter
6, Part 8, Library Theft, photographs of the items alleged to have been taken
or converted are competent evidence of the items and are admissible in any
proceeding, hearing, or trial as if the items themselves were introduced as
evidence.
(3) The photographs shall bear a written description of the items alleged to
have been taken or converted, the name of the owner, or the store, establishment, or library, as appropriate, where the alleged offense occurred, the name
of the accused, the name of the arresting peace officer, the date of the
photograph, and the name of the photographer.
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(4) The writing shall be made under oath by the arresting peace officer, and
the photographs identified by the signature of the photographer. Upon the
filing of the photograph and writing with the authority or court holding the
items as evidence, they shall be returned to their owner, or returned to the
proprietor or manager of the store or establishment, or to an employee of the
library, as is appropriate.
History: L. 1979, ch. 78, § 5; 1987, ch. 245,

§ 1; 1989, ch. 22, § 43.

76-6-606. Penalty.
A violation of this chapter shall be punished in accordance with Section
76-6-412(1).
History: L. 1979, ch. 78, § 6.

76-6-607. Report of arrest to division.
Any arrest made for a violation of this part shall be reported by the
appropriate jurisdiction to the Law Enforcement and Technical Services
Divisionof the Department of Public Safety, which shall keep a record of the
arrest together with the disposition of the arrest for purposes of inquiry by any
law enforcement agency.
History: L. 1979, ch. 78,

§ 379.

§

7; 1993, ch. 234,

Amendment Notes. - The 1993 amendment, effective July 1, 1993, substituted "part"
for "act," substituted "Law Enforcement and
TechnicalServices Division of the Department
of Public Safety" for "state bureau of criminal
identification,"and made two stylistic changes.

Severability Clauses. - Section 8 of Laws
1979, ch. 78 provided: "If any provision of this
act, or its application to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this act
shall not be affected thereby."
Cross-References. - Law Enforcement
and Technical Services Division, § 53-5-103 et
seq.

PART7
COMPUTER CRIMES
76-6-701. Computer Crimes Act -

Short title.

This part is known as the "Utah Computer Crimes Act."
History: L. 1979, ch. 75, § 1; 1986, ch. 123,

§ 1.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Utah Legislative Survey- 1979, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 155.
A.L.R.- Criminal liability for theft of, interference with, or unauthorized use of com-

puter programs, files, or systems, 51 A.L.R.4th
971.
What is computer "trade secret" under state
law, 53 A.L.R.4th 1046.

241

76-6-702

76-6-702.

CRIMINAL CODE

Definitions.

As used in this part:
( 1) "Access" means to directly or indirectly use, attempt to use, instruct,
communicate with, cause input to, cause output from, or otherwise make
use of any resources of a computer, computer system, computer network,
or any means of communication with any of them.
(2) "Computer" means any electronic device or communication facility
with data processing ability.
(3) "Computer system" means a set of related, connected or unconnected, devices, software, or other related computer equipment.
(4) "Computer network" means the interconnection of communication
or telecommunication lines between computers or computers and remote
terminals.
(5) "Computer property" includes, but is not limited to, electronic
impulses, electronically produced data, information, financial instruments, software, or programs, in either machine or human readable form,
any other tangible or intangible item relating to a computer, computer
system, computer network, and copies of any of them.
(6) "Services" include, but are not limited to, computer time, data
manipulation, and storage functions.
(7) "Financial instrument" includes, but is not limited to, any check,
draft, money order, certificate of deposit, letter of credit, bill of exchange,
credit card, or marketable security.
(8) "Software" or "program"means a series of instructions or statements
in a form acceptable to a computer, relating to the operations of the
computer, or permitting the functioning of a computer system in a manner
designed to provide results including, but not limited to, system control
programs, application programs, or copies of any of them.
§

History: L. 1979, ch. 75, § 2; 1986, ch. 123,
2.

76-6-703.

Computer crimes and penalties.

(1) A person who gains or attempts to gain access to and without authorization intentionally, and to the damage of another, alters, damages, destroys,
discloses, or modifies any computer, computer network, computer property,
computer system, program, or software is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
(2) A person who intentionally and without authorization uses a computer,
computer network, computer property, or computer system to gain or attempt
to gain access to any other computer, computer network, computer property, or
computer system, program, or software, to the damage of another, and alters,
damages, destroys, discloses, or modifies any of these, is guilty of a felony of the
third degree.
(3) A person who uses or knowingly allows another person to use any
computer, computer network, computer property, or computer system, program, or software to devise or execute any artifice or scheme to defraud or to
obtain money, property, services, or other things of value by false pretenses,
promises, or representations, is guilty of a felony of the second degree.
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(4) A person who intentionally, and without authorization, interferes with or
interrupts computer services to another authorized to receive the services is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(5) A person who intentionally and without authorization damages or
destroys, in whole or in part, any computer, computer network, computer
property, or computer system is guilty of a class A misdemeanor unless the
amount of damage exceeds $1,000, in which case the person is guilty of a felony
of the third degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-703, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 123, § 3.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws

1986, ch. 123, § 3 repeals § 76-6-703, as enacted by Laws 1979, ch. 75, § 3, and enacts the
above section.

76-6-704. Attorney general, county attorney, or district
attorney to prosecute - Conduct violating other
statutes.
(1) The attorney general, district attorney, or the county attorney shall
prosecute suspected criminal violations of this part.
(2) Prosecution under this part does not prevent any prosecutions under any
other law.
History: L. 1979, ch. 75, § 4; 1986, ch. 123,

§ 4; 1993, ch. 38, § 77.

Amendment Notes. -

The 1993 amend-

ment, effective May 3, 1993, inserted "district
attorney'' in Subsection (1).

76-6-705. Reporting violations.
Every person, except those to whom a statutory or common law privilege
applies, who has reason to believe that the provisions of Section 76-6-703 are
being or have been violated shall report the suspected violation to the attorney
general, or county attorney, or, if within a prosecution district, the district
attorney of the county or prosecution district in which part or all of the
violations occurred.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-705, enacted by L.
1986,ch. 123, § 5; 1993, ch. 38, § 78.
Amendment Notes. - The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, inserted "or, if

within a prosecution district, the district attorney" and "or prosecution district" and made
stylistic changes.

PARTS
LIBRARY THEFT
76-6-801. Acts constituting

library theft.

A person is guilty of the crime of library theft when he willfully, for the
purpose of converting to personal use, and depriving the owner, conceals on his
person or among his belongings library materials while on the premises of the
library or willfully and without authority removes library materials from the
library building with the intention of converting them to his own use.
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History: L. 1981, ch. 168, § 1; 1987, ch.
245, § 2.

76-6-802.

Presumption

of intent.

A person who willfully conceals library materials on his person or among his
belongings while on the premises of the library or in its immediate vicinity is
prima facie presumed to have concealed library materials with the intention of
converting them to his own use. If library materials are found concealed upon
his person or among his belongings, or electronic security devices are activated
by the person's presence, it is prima facie evidence of willful concealment.
History: L. 1981, ch. 168, § 2; 1987, ch.
245, § 3.

76-6-803.

Mutilation or damaging
library theft.

of library material as

A person is guilty of the crime of library theft when he intentionally or
recklessly writes upon, injures, defaces, tears, cuts, mutilates, destroys, or
otherwise damages library materials.
History: L. 1981, ch. 168, § 3; 1987, ch.
245, § 4.

76-6-803.30. Failure to return library material as library
theft - Notice - Failure to pay replacement
value - Written notice.
(1) A person is guilty oflibrary theft when, having possession or having been
in possession of library materials, he:
(a) fails to return the materials within 30 days after receiving written
notice demanding return of the materials; or
(b) if the materials are lost or destroyed, fails to pay the replacement
value of the materials within 30 days after being notified.
(2) Written notice is considered received upon the sworn affidavit of the
person delivering the notice with a statement as to the date, place, and manner
of delivery, or upon proof that the notice was mailed postage prepaid, via the
United States Postal Service, to the current address listed for the person in the
library records.
History: C. 1953, § 76-6-803.30, enacted
by L. 1987, ch. 245, § 5.

76-6-803.60. Detention of theft
ployee - Purposes.

suspect

by library

em-

(1) Any employee of the library who has probable cause to believe that a
person has committed library theft may detain the person, on or off the
premises of a library, in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length of
time for all or any of the following purposes:
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(a) to make reasonable inquiry as to whether the person has in his
possession concealed library materials;
(b) to request identification;
(c) to verify identification;
(d) to make a reasonable request of the person to place or keep in full
view any library materials the individual may have removed, or which the
employee has reason to believe he may have removed, from its place of
display or elsewhere, whether for examination, or for any other reasonable
purpose;
(e) to inform a peace officer of the detention of the person and surrender
that person to the custody of a peace officer; or
(f) in the case of a minor, to inform a peace officer, the parents,
guardian, or other private person interested in the welfare of the minor as
soon as possible of this detention and to surrender custody of the minor to
this person.
(2) An employee may make a detention under this section off the library
premises only if the detention is pursuant to an immediate pursuit of the
person.
History: C. 1953, § 76-6-803.60, enacted
by L. 1987, ch. 245, § 6.

76-6-803.90. Liability Reasonableness.

Defense

-

Probable

cause

-

In any action for false arrest, false imprisonment, unlawful detention,
defamation of character, assault, trespass, or invasion of civil rights brought by
any person detained by an employee of the library, it is a defense to the action
that the employee of the library detaining the person had probable cause to
believe that the person had committed library theft and that the employee
acted reasonably under all circumstances.
History: C. 1953, § 76-6-803.90, enacted
by L. 1987, ch. 245, § 7.

76-6-804. "Book or other library materials" defined.
The terms "book or other library materials" as used in this act include any
book, plate, picture, photograph, _engraving, painting, drawing, map, newspaper, magazine, pamphlet, broadside, manuscript, document, letter, public
record, microfilm, sound recording; audiovisual materials in any format,
electronic data processing records, artifacts, or other documentary, written or
printed materials regardless of physical form or characteristics, belonging to,
on loan to, or otherwise in the custody of the following:
(1) any public library;
(2) any library of an educational or historical society;
(3) any museum; or
(4) any repository of public records.
History: L. 1981, ch. 168, § 4.
Meaning of "this act." - Laws 1981, ch.
168 enacted §§ 76-6-801 to 76-6-805.
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Penalty.

Any person violating the provisions of this act shall be subject to provisions
of Section 76-6-412.
History: L. 1981, ch. 168, § 5.
Meaning of "this act." - See note under
§ 76-6-804.

PART9
CULTURAL SITES PROTECTION
76-6-901.

Definitions.

(1) "Antiquities" means:
(a) all material remains and their associations, recoverable through
excavation or surface collection, that provide information pertaining to the
historic or prehistoric peoples in the state; and
(b) vertebrate fossils and other exceptional fossils and fossil sites
designated as state landmarks.
(2) "Persons" means an individual, corporation, partnership, trust, institution, association, or any other private entity or any officer, employee, agent,
department, or instrumentality of the United States, of any Native American
tribe, or of any state or political subdivision of any state.
(3) "State lands" means all lands owned by Utah, including all lands owned
by political subdivisions, and school and institutional trust lands.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-901, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 277, § 1.

76-6-902.

Prohibitions.

(1) It is unlawful for any person to alter, remove, injure, or destroy
antiquities without the landowner's consent.
(2) It is unlawful to reproduce, rework, or forge any antiquities or make any
object, whether copies or not, or falsely label, describe, identify, or offer for sale
or exchange any object with the intent to represent the object as original and
genuine, nor may any person offer any object for sale or exchange that was
collected or excavated in violation of this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-902, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 277, § 2.

76-6-903.

Penalties.

(1) (a) Any person who violates this part or who counsels, procures, solicits,
or employs any other person to violate this part is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
(b) In the case of a second or subsequent violation, the person is guilty
of a third degree felony.
(2) All property used in conjunction with the criminal activity, together with
all photographs and records, shall be forfeited to the state, and all articles and
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material discovered, collected, excavated, or offered for sale or exchange shall
be surrendered to the landowner.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-903, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 277, § 3; 1991, ch. 241, § 94.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amend-

ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted
"class B" for "class Pt in Subsection (1).

CHAPTER6a
PYRAMID SCHEMES
Section
76-6a-1.
76-6a-2.
76-6a-3.

Short title.
Definitions.
Schemes prohibited - Violation
as deceptive consumer sales
practice - Prosecution of civil
violations.

Section
76-6a-4.
76-6a-5.
76-6a-6.

Operation as felony - Investigation - Prosecution.
Plan provisions not constituting
defenses.
Rights of persons giving consideration in scheme.

76-6a-1. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Pyramid Scheme Act."
History: C. 1953, 76-6a-1, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 89, § 1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Utah Legislative Survey - 1983, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 208.

A.L.R. - Validity of pyramid distribution
plan, 54 A.L.R.3d 217.

76-6a-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Consideration" does not include payment for sales demonstration
equipment and materials furnished at cost for use in making sales and not
for resale, or time or effort spent in selling or recruiting activities.
(2) "Compensation" means money bonuses, commissions, overrides,
prizes, or other real or personal property, tangible or intangible.
(3) "Person" includes a business trust, estate, trust, joint venture, or
any other legal or commercial entity.
(4) "Pyramid scheme" means any sales device or plan under which a
person gives consideration to another person in exchange for compensation or the right to receive compensation which is derived primarily from
the introduction of other persons into the sales device or plan rather than
from the sale of goods, services, or other property.
History: C. 1953, 76-6a-2, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 89, § 1.
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Schemes prohibited - Violation as deceptive
consumer sales practice - Prosecution of civil
violations.

(1) A person may not organize, establish, promote, or administer any
pyramid scheme.
(2) A criminal conviction under this chapter is prima facie evidence of a
violation of Section 13-11-4, the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act.
(3) Any violation of this chapter constitutes a violation of Section 13-11-4,
the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act.
(4) All civil violations of this chapter shall be investigated and prosecuted as
prescribed by the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act.
History: C. 1953, 76-6a-3, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 89, § 1.

76-6a-4.

Operation as felony - Investigation
tion.

- Prosecu-

(1) Any person who knowingly organizes, establishes, promotes, or administers a pyramid scheme is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) The appropriate county attorney or district attorney has primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting criminal violations of this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 76-6a-4, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 89, § 1; 1993, ch. 38, § 79.
Amendment Notes. - The 1993 amend-

76-6a-5.

Plan provisions

ment, effective May 3, 1993, inserted "or district attorney" in Subsection (2).

not constituting

defenses.

It is not a defense to an action brought under this chapter if:
(1) The sales device or plan limits the number of persons who may be
introduced into it;
(2) The sales device or plan includes additional conditions affecting
eligibility for introduction into it or when compensation is received from it;
or
(3) A person receives property or services in addition to the compensation or right to receive compensation in connection with a pyramid
scheme.
History: C. 1953, 76-6a-5, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 89, § 1.

76-6a-6.

Rights of
scheme.

persons

giving

consideration

in

(1) Any person giving consideration in connection with a pyramid scheme
may, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, declare his giving of
consideration and the related sale or contract for sale void, and may bring a
court action to recover the consideration. In the action, the court shall, in
addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff, require the defendant to pay
to the plaintiff interest as provided in Section 15-1-4, reasonable attorneys'
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fees, and the costs of the action reduced by any compensation paid by the
defendant to the plaintiff in connection with the pyramid scheme.
(2) The rights, remedies, and penalties provided in this chapter are independent of and supplemental to each other and to any other right, remedy or
penalty available in law or equity. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be
construed to diminish or abrogate any other right, remedy or penalty.
History: C. 1953, 76-Ga-6, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 89, § 1.
Severability Clauses. - Section 2 of Laws
1983, ch. 89 provided: "If any provision of this

chapter, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the
remainder of this chapter shall not be affected
thereby."

CHAPTER7
OFFENSES AGAINST THE FAMILY
Part 1

Section

Marital Violations
Section
76-7-101.
76-7-102.
76-7-103.
76-7-104.

Bigamy - Defense mony.
Incest.
Adultery.
Fornication.

Testi-

Part2
Nonsupport and Sale of Children
76-7-201.
76-7-202.
76-7-203.
76-7-204.

Criminal nonsupport.
Orders for support in criminal
nonsupport proceedings.
Sale of child - Felony - Payment of adoption-related expenses.
Prohibition of surrogate parenthood agreements - Status of
child - Basis of custody.

Part3
Abortion
76-7-301.
76-7-301.1.
76-7-302.
76-7-303.
76-7-304.

76-7-305.

76-7-305.5.

Definitions.
Preamble - Findings and policies of Legislature.
Circumstances
under which
abortion authorized.
Concurrence of attending physician based on medical judgment.
Considerations by physician Notice to minor's parents or
guardian or married woman's
husband.
Informed consent requirements
for abortion - 24-hour wait
mandatory - Emergency exception.
Consent - Printed materials to

be available to patient - Annual report of Department of
Health.
Physician, hospital employee, or
76-7-306.
hospital not required to participate in abortion.
Medical procedure required to
76-7-307.
save life of unborn child.
Medical skills required to pre76-7-308.
serve life of unborn child.
Pathologist's report.
76-7-309.
Experimentation with unborn
76-7-310.
children prohibited - Testing
for genetic defects.
Selling and buying unborn chil76-7-311.
dren prohibited.
Intimidation or coercion of per76-7-312.
son to obtain abortion prohibited.
Physician's report to Depart76-7-313.
ment of Health.
76-7-314.
Violations of abortion laws Classifications.
Exceptions to certain require76-7-315.
ments in serious medical
emergency.
Actions not precluded.
76-7-316.
76-7-317.
Separability clause.
76-7-317.1.
Creation of Abortion Litigation
Trust Account.
Finding of unconstitutionality
76-7-317.2.
- Revival of old law.
76-7-318 to 76-7-320. Repealed.
76-7-321.
Contraceptive and abortion services - Funds - Minor Definitions.
76-7-322.
Public funds for provision of
contraceptive or abortion services restricted.
76-7-323.
Public funds for support entities
providing contraceptive or
abortion services restricted.
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